The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
514.
In response to
questions, Mr Blair stated:
•
Inspections
were the right process, but the inspectors had only just started
their
work and
reached their full complement the previous week. There was no
point
in putting
an “arbitrary timescale” on their task. Saddam Hussein had a duty
to
co‑operate.
In Mr Blair’s view, Iraq’s declaration of 8 December was false
and it
was the
inspectors’ job to find out the truth and report their
findings.
•
If there
was a breach, there would be a further discussion at the UN and the
UK
expected
the UN to honour its undertakings and for its authority to be
upheld.
•
The trade
in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons posed a direct threat
to
Britain’s
security. Without a stand, it was simply a matter of time before
terrorism
and weapons
of mass destruction came together. Iraq was important because
it
was known
that Saddam Hussein had the weapons and had used them
before.
It had been
“chosen” by the UN and the UN “had to be a way of
resolving
this and
sending a signal to the whole of the world that this trade will not
be
tolerated,
that people who have these weapons in breach of UN resolutions,
will
be forced
to disarm”.
•
The
“discussion” on Iraq had “begun against the background of
sanctions
eroding, of
us being unable to be sure that we were really preventing
Saddam
acquiring
these weapons and of intelligence to the British Security Services
…
I don’t
think they would be advising me this if they weren’t doing this
honestly
and
properly. There is no doubt at all in our mind that Saddam has been
trying to
rebuild
that arsenal of chemical, biological and potentially nuclear
capability …”
•
Indicting
Saddam Hussein was “kept under consideration” and
“reasonable
arguments”
had been made by Ms Ann Clwyd, Vice‑Chair of the
Parliamentary
Labour
Party and Chair of INDICT (see Box later in this Section), and
others. It
would be a
decision for the Attorney General “but we have to weigh up a
number
of
different considerations as to whether it is worth such a
prosecution. But I
don’t think
that should divert us from the main issue … which is … whether it
is
necessary
to change the regime in Iraq in order to disarm them of weapons
of
mass
destruction.”
•
There was
“no point in speculating” about what might happen if the US
wanted
to take
action before a smoking gun had been found; whatever
happened,
Saddam
would be disarmed.
•
The way to
avoid military action would be for Saddam “to agree to make
an
honest
declaration of what he has and have it destroyed”.
92