14.1 | Military equipment (post-conflict)

1166. On 16 February, Mr Stephen Smith, Deputy Command Secretary at PJHQ,

sought Mr Ingram’s approval to deploy additional weapons on counter‑IDF operations,

in addition to the Light Guns and C‑RAM systems.614 He wrote that IDF was responsible

for “inflicting the second highest number of casualties against the UK after IEDs” and the

threat was likely to increase when UK forces re‑postured to the COB.

1167. Physical protection measures were “approaching their practical limit” until a

Tier 3 solution was delivered and Maj Gen Shirreff had reported that IDF was “having

a detrimental psychological effect on our troops”.

1168. Mr Ingram replied on 19 February, agreeing that the extra weapons could be

deployed.615

1169. In a Force Level Review on 26 February, Lt Gen Houghton advised that there

was “scope to re‑task” up to two Sea King helicopters to other operations by mid‑June

because of “MND(SE) force dispositions and Merlin SH capacity”.616

1170. Lt Gen Houghton suggested that the four remaining Sea King helicopters would

be dedicated to ISTAR, but it might be possible to withdraw some of them with the arrival

of other UAVs anticipated later in the year, including Hermes 450 in mid‑June.

1171. Lt Gen Houghton wrote that “the very best case ISD” for the UK C‑RAM capability

to protect the COB was 31 May and it seemed “highly likely” to slip. He added: “The

battle procedure to deliver this is ongoing and the system will require up to 100

personnel to support it.”

1172. On 7 March, Mr Browne sent “a personal memo” to Mr Ingram and Lord Drayson

about IDF.617 He wrote:

“IDF is an issue we have all been aware of, and striving to address, for some months

now.”

1173. Mr Browne noted that “significant improvements” had been made but “also, with

real concern, the new estimate of the likelihood of a successful indirect fire attack” and

its consequences:

“IDF must be one of our very highest priorities. I am not convinced that our current

plans are ambitious or decisive enough.”

614 Minute Smith to PS/Min(AF), 16 February 2007, ‘Iraq: Countering Indirect Fire Attacks’.

615 Minute Johnson to PS/Minister(AF), 19 February 2007, ‘Iraq: Countering Indirect Fire Attacks’.

616 Minute Houghton to Chiefs of Staff, 26 February 2007, ‘Op TELIC 10/11 Force Level Review – Feb 07’.

617 Minute SofS [MOD] to Min(AF), 7 March 2007, ‘Iraq – Force Protection Risks – Indirect Fire, Personal

Memo from SofS’.

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