The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
357.
The paper said
that elections were not yet possible because there was
no
Constitution,
no accurate electoral roll, no free media, and political parties
were not
well
established. Realistically, the process of drafting a Constitution
would take six to
eight
months. Elections might then happen within two months of the
ratification of the
Constitution,
which would mean summer 2004.
358.
The paper also
recorded calls for an earlier transfer of sovereignty and
suggested
that Sir
Jeremy Greenstock should explore with the GC and Ambassador
Bremer
whether
there was a “credible or viable way to move to a provisional
Government, with
or without
sovereignty, in advance of elections”.
359.
On 4
September, Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary wrote to
Mr Rycroft to report that:
“… in the
light of the changing security situation in the South-East of Iraq
and in view
of likely
next steps by the CPA, the Defence Secretary had concluded that
there
is an
immediate requirement to deploy a further two infantry battalions
and certain
specialist
capabilities to Iraq … we intend to identify and put on reduced
notice to
move a
Brigade HQ, Infantry battalion and engineer capability as a
contingency to
support the
implementation of the CPA(S) plan for emergency infrastructure work
…”214
360.
In advance of
a planned conversation between Mr Blair and President Bush
on
5
September, Sir Nigel Sheinwald spoke twice to Dr
Rice.215
361.
Sir Nigel
emphasised “the need to reflect in our [security] strategy our
assessment
of the new
and growing threats to the Coalition. There was a mood of
considerable
concern in
London, requiring a response across the board.”
362.
Dr Rice agreed
that there was “reason for concern”, but there was also a sense
on
the US side
that things were not going as badly as the media portrayed and that
an effort
should be
made to inject more balance. Sir Nigel and Dr Rice “agreed that the
level of
overall
concern in London was maybe a notch or two higher than in
Washington”. They
also agreed
that the video conference between the Prime Minister and the
President
should
concentrate on security, reconstruction, infrastructure and
utilities, media, and
prospects
for international contributions.
363.
Sir Nigel
congratulated Dr Rice on the US draft of the new Security
Council
resolution.
He observed that the UK “had some comments; but if we could get
something
like it
agreed, it should make a substantial difference
internationally”.
364.
After their
conversations, Sir Nigel sent Dr Rice a Note from Mr Blair for
President
Bush to see
ahead of the video conference on 5 September.216
214
Letter
Williams to Rycroft, 4 September 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Forces and
Resources Review’.
215
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 4 September 2003, ‘Conversations with Condi
Rice, 3 and 4 September:
Iraq’.
216
Letter
Sheinwald to Rice, 5 September 2003, [untitled],
attaching Note [Blair to Bush], [untitled].
268