1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
•
destroyed
some key buildings of the Iraqi Directorate of General Security,
which
were
believed to contain “key equipment and documents”; and
•
“set back”
Iraq’s ability to regenerate its biological and chemical
capability.
731.
The UK could
not afford to ignore the problem of Iraq. Saddam Hussein
continued
“to pose a
significant threat to his neighbours” and would “reconstitute his
biological and
chemical
weapons capabilities if allowed”. UK forces would stay in the
region for as long
as it was
judged necessary and sanctions would remain in place until Iraq
complied with
its
obligations.
732.
The USA and
the UK did not seek specific authorisation from the UN
Security
Council for
Operation Desert Fox and instead drew their authority from
previous
resolutions,
especially resolution 1205.
733.
Their
interpretation of the legal authority provided by those resolutions
was not
supported
by other Security Council members. Russia in particular disputed
the legal
basis for
military action. Resolution 1205 had used the formulation “flagrant
violation”
rather than
“material breach”, the recognised phrase derived from the law of
treaties for
a breach
which would entitle another party to argue that a cease-fire had
been broken.
734.
Sir Jeremy
told the Inquiry:
“… my use
of resolution 1205 seriously annoyed my Russian counterpart,
because
he realised
that I had succeeded in establishing … a declaration of
material
breach286
of Iraq
which he hadn’t intended should be allowed by the
resolution,
which then
lay the basis for the use of force in December
1998.”287
735.
On
24 September 1998, the JIC had assessed:
“We cannot
rule out the possibility that Saddam retains a handful of missiles
…
these could
be available for use within a matter of weeks or perhaps even
days.
Provided it
still has key components – and that is unclear – Iraq could within
a few
months
build, with little risk of detection, missiles capable of hitting
Israel and key
targets in
Saudi Arabia. If it needs to make or acquire the components,
production of
such
missiles could begin within a year …”288
736.
The Butler
Report concluded that JIC readers in December 1998 would
have
had the
impression that Iraq had the ability “to regenerate a small number
of ballistic
missiles,
either through bringing back into use missiles that had been hidden
or by
re‑assembling
missiles from hidden components”.
286
Resolution
1205 refers
only to “flagrant violation”.
287
Public
hearing, 27 November 2009, page 35.
288
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
52.
161