The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
appearing
in the press about ‘inducements’ to secure votes only makes it
harder for the
Africans
to come on board”.
975.
The report was
sent to Sir Michael Jay, Sir Jeremy Greenstock and Sir
Richard
Dearlove.
It was also widely circulated within No.10.
976.
Mr Rycroft
commented to Mr Blair: “An effective visit, but the three
votes are not
yet in the
bag.”
977.
Mr Blair
was informed on the evening of 4 March that US military
planners
were
looking at 12 March as the possible start date for the military
campaign;
and that
Mr Hoon was concerned about the “apparent disconnect” with
activity
in the UN.
978.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretary informed Sir David Manning on the evening
of
4 March
that Adm Boyce had reported indications of growing pressure from US
military
commanders,
for force posture and other reasons, to take early military action:
and that
12 March
had emerged as a possible start date for the military
campaign.301
979.
Mr Hoon
was “concerned by the apparent disconnect between US
military
planning
and continuing diplomatic activity in the UN” and thought that Sir
David “might
wish to
ensure that Condi Rice is alive to the continuing need to keep the
diplomatic and
military
tracks aligned”.
980.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit, the MOD Permanent Under Secretary, wrote to Sir
Andrew
Turnbull,
the Cabinet Secretary, on 5 March about the need for an agreed
legal basis
for military
action.302
That is
addressed in Section 5.
981.
In Prime
Minister’s Questions on 5 March, Mr Blair expressed
confidence
in the
prospects for securing a second resolution.
982.
In response to
a question from Ms Lynne Jones (Labour) asking whether
nine
affirmative
votes would provide “clear” legal authority “for war”,
Mr Blair responded that
the
Government would “always act in accordance with international law”
and that “we
are
confident of securing the votes for that resolution and we will
carry on working for
that end”.
He added:
“… I know
that we both agree the authority of the UN is important. If that
authority
is to
be upheld, it is important that what we said last November is
implemented.
If it is
not, the effect on the UN … would be disastrous.”303
301
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Timing of Military
Action’.
302
Letter
Tebbit to Turnbull, 5 March 2003, [untitled].
303
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 5 March
2003, column 817.
356