The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

“TB briefed on the Chirac call, said the divide was between those prepared to

consider military action and those who were not, who would give him [Saddam?]

as much time as he wanted.

“Bush said that he did not trust the French but we had to do a slow waltz with them

in the next few days. He felt they thought America was more guilty than Saddam.

“TB said that the French appearing to be so unreasonable had been a big mistake

by Chirac.”183

550. Asked whether he had agreed with President Bush on 14 March that “the game

was up”, Mr Blair said:

“The game was up in the sense that we were not going to get a resolution. This

was the second best … Our preference was to have got a resolution that passed

the Security Council … I was very conscious that I had Cabinet members who were

unhappy about this … that it might give us some political weight, I mean not much

frankly, but some if we could say at least we have a majority of members on our

side, even though we knew we were not going to get the resolution.”184

551. Mr Blair added:

“It is simply a political point. If you can say, ‘Well we didn’t get the resolution

because France vetoed but nonetheless we got the majority of the Security Council

in our favour,’ it would allow us to say that … It would have helped me. I would have

definitely used this in terms of the presentation of the case …”

552. President Lagos initially informed Mr Blair on 14 March that the UK

proposals did not have Chile’s support and that he was working on other ideas.

553. Later President Lagos informed Mr Blair that he would not pursue his

proposals unless Mr Blair or President Bush asked him to.

554. No.10 reported that President Lagos told Mr Blair on 14 March that the “elected

six” had been working on some ideas which they planned to announce at “noon”

(New York time).185 Those ideas were “based on reasonable benchmarks and timing,

but also the use of force if Saddam did not comply”.

555. President Lagos also told Mr Blair that the draft resolution tabled on 7 March did

not have Chile’s support and he “had the impression that France and Russia were now

183 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

184 Public hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 107-108.

185 Letter [Francis] Campbell to Owen, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President

Lagos of Chile, 14 March’.

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