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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
for biological agent production and 30,000 munitions for the delivery of chemical and
biological agents”.113
331.  Mr Straw reminded his colleagues that a false statement did not represent a
material breach, “but it could be a contributing factor”. The next step would be increased
efforts by the inspectors to find the evidence. The inspectors had to report to the UN
Security Council on progress by 27 January. By that time, “the Security Council could be
in a position to declare a material breach”. President Bush would be making his State of
the Union speech on 28 January.
332.  Mr Hoon informed his colleagues that, “to be ready for possible military action”,
it was “increasingly necessary to make visible preparations. Contracts for equipment
would be let; Reservists and their employers would be consulted; the notice to move
for some units would be reduced; and a naval Task Group led by HMS Ark Royal
would depart for exercises.” The US had not yet finalised its military planning but it was
“already building up a formidable force and would be ready to use it”.
333.  Mr Blair said that “there would be an opportunity to discuss Iraq in the New Year”.
334.  Mr Campbell wrote in his diaries that Ms Clare Short, the International
Development Secretary, had pointed up the need for more discussion on Iraq.114
Security Council, 19 December 2002
335.  In response to a briefing from Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei on 19 December, the
Security Council agreed to a further discussion early the following month, after
members of the Council had completed their analytical work.
336.  Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported overnight on 17/18 December that Dr Blix would
tell the Security Council on 19 December that it could not have confidence that the
declaration “disposed of” the question of Iraq’s WMD holdings but that he could not say
Iraq definitely had WMD; there was more work to do and the ball was in Iraq’s court.115
337.  On 17 and 18 December, Secretary Powell and Mr Straw discussed the pressure
on the US Administration to say “something strong” (in response to Dr Blix’s briefing to
Members of the Security Council) and the need to catch Iraq “red‑handed”.116
338.  Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei briefed Members of the Security Council on 19 December
on inspections in Iraq and their preliminary assessment of Iraq’s declaration.117
113  Cabinet Conclusions, 19 December 2002.
114  Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown
to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.
115  Telegram 2411 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 18 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Handling of WMD
Declaration’.
116  Letter [1] McDonald to Manning, 18 December 2002, ‘Iraq’; Letter [2] McDonald to Manning,
18 December 2002, ‘Iraq’.
117  UN Press Release, 19 December 2002, Statement to press on Iraq inspections by Security Council
President (SC/7614).
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