3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
“So the
answer … was to use 1441 fully. Reinforce the inspectors. If after
a time
it did not
work, then force could be considered. The problems of the world
had
to be
solved through collective responsibility … If the route he had set
out proved
unsuccessful,
then France would assume its responsibilities with the
rest.”
89.
Other points
made during the discussion included:
•
Mr Joschka
Fischer, the German Vice-Chancellor and Foreign
Minister,
supported
Mr de Villepin’s proposals for strengthened
inspections.
•
Ms Palacio
said that it was the message to Saddam Hussein that a
change
of will
was needed that had to be strengthened, not the
inspections.
•
Mr Straw
said that more inspectors and equipment would not solve
anything.
The
fundamental point was that “Iraq was not complying. If there
was
co-operation,
there was no need for greater numbers. If there was
no
co-operation, higher numbers could not help.” The inspectors
needed
intellectual
evidence, “Yet Iraqi scientists had been terrorised into
silence.”
Mr de
Villepin’s proposal was “a chimera, a false message. And it would
lead
to split in
the Council.” The key was co-operation.
•
Mr Ivanov
stated that there were complaints, but the inspectors had to
continue
and Russia
would help. President Putin had asked him to set out a list of
the
current
problems and work with the Iraqis to solve them. “Baghdad could
hardly
change
overnight … Pressure would be needed. But the opportunities
for
a political
settlement were far from being exhausted.”
90.
Sir Jeremy
reported that, as Council President, Mr Fischer had tried to
sum up that:
“There was
agreement the Council should send out the message that a very
serious
point had
been reached. This was a major crisis with widespread
consequences.
War would
be very damaging. 1441 had to be implemented fully. Inspections
must
continue:
there was no contradiction between that and the presence of
sharp
instruments.
The message to Baghdad had to be that they now had to
deliver.”
91.
Secretary
Powell had not, however allowed that to stand. He had listened to
the
arguments
for a peaceful solution but the Council had “so far been denied
that”. The US:
“… was not
fixated on war … But he would not accept the premise that the
world
could not
accept the risks. He hoped it would not come to war. But war could
even
produce
good results. If it came to that point, the US would be happy to
act with
a coalition
of the willing under the authority of the UN, in the full
understanding
of the risk
of unintended consequences and of the overall situation in the
Middle
East. Too
much time had already gone by.”
195