The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

527.  Without exaggerating the problem, Sir Peter also wanted Mr Miliband to be

aware of:

“… tensions under the surface between some on the UK military side (more

[Lieutenant] General [William] Rollo [Senior British Military Representative – Iraq]

in Baghdad than [Major] General [Graham] Binns [GOC MND(SE)] in Basra)… who

think that the civilians are moving too slowly and unimaginatively, and the UK PRT

in Basra who feel that they have been turned on a sixpence from an expectation of

closing down in the Spring of 2008 to a series of big new expectations, but not much

more resources to deliver them. Des Browne has picked up this military view.”

528.  Separately, Sir Peter Ricketts suggested to Mr Baker that improving conditions

in Baghdad, though not Basra, called for a reassessment of policy on the length of

postings.348 Many staff were highly motivated and able to cope with an extra six months,

if not a second year: “Quite a head of steam is building up on this issue and it needs to

be tackled.” Sir Peter also reported that Mr Christopher Prentice, British Ambassador

to Iraq, had made a persuasive case for an increase in staff numbers as prospects

improved and the pace of work began to increase.

529.  Mr Miliband visited Baghdad, Basra and Erbil from 16 to 18 December.349 On

return, he commented to Mr Brown: “I was struck in talking to members of our locally

engaged staff in Baghdad how fearful for the future they remain – and how much they

have personally borne and continue to bear.”

530.  Mr Miliband was impressed by staff morale and the positive “can‑do” attitude in all

three UK posts. He suggested to Mr Brown that: “We should think about reflecting the

role of our civilian staff more widely in future statements on Iraq to Parliament.”

531.  Mr Tinline sent an annual review for the Basra PRT to the US Embassy in Baghdad

on 19 December.350 He reported that:

“Keeping going has been a huge challenge. The team spent three months

crammed four to an 8 metre x 2 metre pod and seven months under increasingly

heavy rocket attack … And for most of the year we did not know whether we would

still be in Basra in six months’ time. The burden has been greatest on our local

staff. Our legal assistant was killed in April, followed by his father the week after

he attended one of our legal training events. Others have been threatened. They

appreciate that the British assistance scheme [for LE staff] explicitly includes them.

Throughout the spirit and support within the whole team has been tremendous.”

532.  Mr Tinline added that one challenge lying ahead was putting staff on a “sustainable

long term footing (several members have already done two years and we are carrying

some gaps on the rule of law side)”.

348  Minute Ricketts to Baker, 12 December 2007, ‘Visit to Iraq: Administration Points’.

349  Letter Miliband to Prime Minister, 27 December 2007, ‘My Visit to Iraq: 16‑18 December’.

350  Letter Tinline to Powers, 19 December 2007, ‘Basra Provincial Reconstruction Team in 2007’.

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