The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
389.
Sir David
stated that he had also wanted to reflect Mr Blair’s
“preoccupations”
and
thinking. He told Dr Rice that if the US “was thinking about
reviewing its policy
and …
wanted the participation of its allies … it would have to address
allies’ concerns
… including
obviously our own”. He had set out the issues which would need to
be
addressed.
Sir David had also said that, after Afghanistan, the idea of
working with a
coalition
was a “powerful” one.
390.
Summing up the
Cabinet discussion on 14 March on the deteriorating
position
in the
Middle East, Mr Blair referred to his planned meeting with
President Bush and
stated that:
“… it was
necessary to remain close to the Government of the United States
and
to persuade
President Bush to re-engage completely in the [Middle East]
Peace
Process,
not least because it would otherwise be difficult to gather support
for
addressing
the threat posed by the Iraqi regime …”139
391.
Sir
Christopher Meyer wrote to Sir David Manning reporting his
conversation with
Mr Paul
Wolfowitz, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, on 17
March.140
392.
On Iraq, Sir
Christopher took the same line as Sir David had in his discussions
with
the NSC
about the actions necessary if the US wanted to build support for
military action
against
Saddam Hussein.
393.
Sir
Christopher told Mr Wolfowitz that:
“If the UK
were to join with the US in any operation against Saddam, we would
have
to be able
to take a critical mass of parliamentary and public opinion with
us. It was
extraordinary
how people had forgotten how bad he was.”
394.
The UK was
giving serious thought to publishing “a paper that would make
the
case
against Saddam”.
395.
Sir
Christopher reported that Mr Wolfowitz considered the “WMD danger …
was
crucial to
the public case against Saddam, particularly the potential linkage
to terrorism”,
but he saw
“Saddam’s barbarism” as an “indispensable” element of the case for
action.
396.
Sir
Christopher and Mr Wolfowitz also discussed the potential role of
the Iraqi
opposition
and “well documented” debate inside the Administration about
supporting the
Iraqi
National Congress or a wider coalition of opposition groups. Mr
Wolfowitz seemed
to prefer
the former and “brushed over” Sir Christopher’s reference to the
absence
139
Cabinet
Conclusions, 14 March 2002.
140
Letter
Meyer to Manning, 18 March 2002, ‘Iraq and Afghanistan:
Conversation with Wolfowitz’.
456