3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
Iraqi
forces were considerably weaker than they had been in 1991. The
paper
added: “The
greater investment of western forces, the greater our control
of
Iraq’s
future, but the greater the cost and the longer we would need to
stay. The
only
certain means to remove Saddam and his elite is to invade and
impose a
new
government, but this could involve nation building over many
years.” For
logistical
reasons, a ground campaign would not be feasible until autumn
2002.
280.
The three
options were not “mutually exclusive”. The first had a very low
prospect
of success
and the second had no guarantee of success, but either or both
would be
“natural
precursors” to the third.
281.
While bases in
only a few countries would be essential for a successful
invasion,
a wider and
durable international coalition would be advantageous for both
military and
political
reasons. Securing moderate Arab support would be greatly assisted
by the
promise of
a quick and decisive campaign, and credible action by the US to
address
the MEPP.
282.
Any coalition
would need much tending over the difficult months of
preparation:
“Iran,
fearing further US encirclement and that it will be invaded next,
will be prickly
but is
likely to remain neutral. With his regime in danger, Saddam could
use WMD,
either
before or during an invasion. Saddam could also target Israel as he
did during
the Gulf
war. Restraining Israel will be difficult. It could try to pre-empt
a WMD attack
and has
certainly made clear that it would retaliate. Direct Israeli
military involvement
in Iraq
would greatly complicate coalition management and risk sparking
conflict
more
widely.”
“At this
stage we need to wait and see which options or combination of
options may
be favoured
by the US Government.”
284.
No legal
justification for an invasion currently existed.
285.
The Cabinet
Office paper stated:
“A legal
justification for invasion would be needed. Subject to Law Officers
advice,
none
currently exists. This makes moving quickly to invade very
difficult. We should
therefore
consider a staged approach, establishing international support,
building
up the
pressure on Saddam, and developing military plans. There is a lead
time of
about 6
months to a ground offensive.”
286.
A separate
paper prepared by FCO Legal Advisers, ‘Iraq: Legal
Background’,
circulated
as an annex to the Cabinet Office paper, set out the general legal
background,
437