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16.1  |  The welfare of Service Personnel
information and answers they wanted. This will be borne in mind in considering how
best to improve the support they need.”74
101.  The report also stated that, in order to preserve the volunteer ethos of Reservists
and the goodwill of families and employers, the MOD had revised the “desired notice”
period for mobilisation from 14 to 21 days. Operational requirements meant that for
Op TELIC 1, some Reservists received only four days’ notice.
102.  The report did not specify what action would be taken to address these difficulties.
103.  In the same month, an NAO report on Op TELIC stated that some Reservists
received as little as two or three days’ notice, due to absence from home, postal times
and incorrect addresses.75
104.  The MOD set out the role of the Reserve Forces in the February 2005 publication
Future Use of the UK’s Reserve Forces.76 The paper stated that:
In recognition of the fact that most members of the VRF joined to undertake
activities which were a contrast to their civilian employment, the MOD would not
mobilise a Reservist to take advantage of his or her civilian skills except with the
express agreement of the Reservist and their employer. This would not preclude
a commander on operations ordering an already mobilised Reservist to carry out
a task for which he or she was qualified, as a short-term expedient and where
no other alternative existed.
While the Reserve Forces Act 1996 set a limit on the time any Reservist
could be mobilised (generally one year over a three-year period), the MOD
believed that this level of mobilisation was “unsustainable”. The MOD would
therefore, where possible, limit the time that any Reservist would be mobilised
to one year over a five-year period.
The MOD would seek to provide 28 days’ notice of mobilisation
(21 days previously).
105.  In April 2005, the MOD introduced a new remuneration package for Reservists
deployed on operations.77 Under the new scheme, if Reservists were mobilised and
their civilian pay was higher than their Service pay, they could claim the difference,
including certain benefits in kind. There were additional allowances to compensate
for other losses.
106.  Reservists had previously applied for allowances to cover the additional costs
of deployment. The scheme required a Reservist to collate a great deal of evidence
of personal earnings and expenditure in the short time available before deployment.
74  Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December 2003.
75  National Audit Office, Operation TELIC – United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq, 11 December 2003.
76  Ministry of Defence, Future of the UK’s Reserve Forces, 7 February 2005.
77  National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Reserve Forces, 31 March 2006.
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