The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“What 1441
was not was the establishment of a detective or a
containment
exercise …
The final opportunity afforded in SCR 1441 was not for the
Council
to slide
back into process, but for Iraq to recognise a new determination in
the
Security
Council to complete the business in a way which represented a
complete
change of
attitude in Baghdad.
“That has
not happened.”
715.
Sir Jeremy
said that the UK was “convinced” that Iraq had “decided to
remain
in defiance
of the UN”. The reasons included:
•
Iraq had
“only agreed to inspections” after President Bush’s speech
on
12
September 2002 “in a cynical attempt to scupper any new
resolution
strengthening
them”.
•
The Iraqi
letter of 13 November 2002 was “full of tirades and
complaints”,
“grudgingly
accepting that it would ‘deal with’ the resolution”. That was
“way
short of
the wholehearted commitment to voluntary disarmament we
had
hoped for”.
•
Iraq’s
12,000 page declaration was “indisputably inadequate”.
•
Iraq had
“done everything possible to prevent unrestricted
interviews”.
•
Iraq had
“dragged its feet on as many other elements of procedural
co-operation
as
possible. Instead of serious collaboration with the inspectors,
Iraq has tried
to make
the process into a tightly monitored media circus …”
•
“Iraq’s
co-operation on substance has been non-existent … UNMOVIC have
not
been able
to close a single outstanding issue … And there are now even
more
unresolved
questions …”
•
“This
continues … an all too familiar pattern of Iraq trying to get us to
focus
on small
concessions of process, rather than on the big picture … there is
no
semblance
of whole-hearted co-operation … nothing like a regime with
nothing
to hide
…”
716.
Sir Jeremy
concluded that the UK was seeking:
“… to keep
the Council in control of the process and to build renewed
Council
consensus …
that Iraq has made the wrong choice: the choice not to take …
the
final
opportunity voluntarily to disarm … We shall, in detailed
discussions, set out
further the
argument that this choice has been made, that the choice is a
defiance of
1441 and
the available remedies are fast disappearing.”
717.
The UK was
“not asking for any instant judgements”: there was “time still …
for
Iraq to
make the right choice”. The UK would not “call for a vote … until a
proper debate
has been
held”. There was:
“… still an
opportunity to avert conflict. But the Council’s judgement that
Iraq has
made the
wrong choice should be clear and consensual. The last chance for
peace
306