9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
Mr Ali
A Allawi judged that:
“The Iraqi
Constitution of 2005 was not the national compact that many had
thought
necessary
and desirable, but a document arising from a series of political
deals.
It was
seen as a necessary step in the political process and was not
vested with the
quasi‑sacred
status that such documents had in other countries. Nevertheless,
it
enshrined
basic rights and opened up the possibility of a different type of
Iraqi state
than the
one that had gone so disastrously awry.”
Dr Rice
judged in her memoir that the size of the Iraqi ‘yes’ vote sent “a
firm signal about
those
citizens’ yearning for democratic governance.”175
President
Bush went further, describing it as “the most progressive
constitution in the Arab
world – a
document that guaranteed equal rights for all and protected the
freedoms of
religion,
assembly and expression.”176
390.
After the
discussion by video conference on 25 October, Mr Blair asked
the FCO
to produce
a paper on “how we can intensify our efforts on Sunni Arab outreach
in the
run‑up to
and beyond the December elections and formation of the next
Government”.177
391.
Mr Straw’s
Private Secretary sent a paper, cleared by Mr Straw, to
Mr Blair’s Private
Secretary
on 27 October. The paper set out actions for the UK and US in
order to:
•
identify
more of those who control or influence the insurgency;
•
determine
what they wanted and what could reasonably be offered;
•
prepare
them for direct dialogue with the Shia and Kurds;
•
bring the
Shia and Kurds to the dialogue;
•
hold all
sides to the deals they struck; and
•
take
supporting action.
392.
The paper
acknowledged that “exploring the less savoury reaches of the
opposition
risks
alienating Shia and Kurdish politicians”, and that there would be
difficulties “selling
this to the
Americans who remain cautious of dealing with those who, when
offered a
choice
between violence and politics, will choose both”.
393.
If
Mr Blair agreed with the paper’s approach, then the FCO aimed
to instigate
direct and
indirect contact between Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs and Kurds, both
inside and
outside
Iraq plus “supporting action in the media … focusing Sunni Arabs on
the process
ahead and
the incentives for participating in the next
elections”.
394.
Mr Blair
responded that the paper was “good. We need now to action
it
comprehensively,
and in concert with the Americans.”178
175
Rice
C. No Higher
Honour: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. Simon
& Schuster, 2011.
176
Bush
GW. Decision
Points. Virgin
Books, 2010.
177
Letter
Siddiq to Quarrey, 27 October 2005, ‘Iraq: Sunni Arab Outreach’
attaching IPU Paper,
27 October
2005, ‘Sunni Arab outreach’.
178
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Quarrey to Blair, 28 October 2005, ‘Iraq
Update’.
555