14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
987.
The steady
state requirement for helicopters was therefore:
•
five
Merlin;
•
five Sea
King
•
four Lynx;
and
•
three
[Helicopter Broadsword].
988.
Gen Walker
visited Iraq from 22 to 24 November.524
His visit
report recorded:
“… levels
of consent from MNF presence were slowly declining throughout
the
AOR [Area
of Operations]. When considering military activity in the AOR,
broadly
60 percent
of our effort was devoted to force protection and sustainment of
the UK
laydown, 30
percent to SSR [Security Sector Reform] and just 5 percent or so
to
UK COIN
[counter‑insurgency]. Notwithstanding the planned reduction in
British
infantry
companies, the AOR geography and operational situation meant that
there
could not
be a proportional reduction in enablers, particularly support
helicopters
and
ISTAR …”
989.
On the JHF‑I,
Gen Walker wrote:
“… the
weight of force protection and administrative tasking was such that
the JHF‑I
was unable
to achieve any significant stabilisation or security tasking; the
position
was
exacerbated during the two months of the TELIC roulement when the
JHF‑I
had no
spare capacity; it was questionable whether this fixing of precious
support
helicopter
(SH) capability made tactical, operational or logistical
sense.”
990.
In his
Hauldown Report on 12 December, Maj Gen Dutton wrote to
AM Torpy:
“Helicopters
have always been important in this area, half the size of England
and
Wales, but
the EFP threat has made them essential. I have been grateful for
the
readiness
to support us with extra when required and we have reciprocated
by
readily
agreeing to a reduction when the immediate crisis passed. However
this
should not
disguise the national lack of helicopters to service the operations
that we
are now
conducting. Massaging airframes and hours can only go so far: the
simple
fact is
that we need more helicopters (and aircrew)
urgently.”525
991.
In his
post‑tour report on 18 January 2006, Maj Gen Dutton
reiterated the point:
“The hours
available to the aircraft in theatre are simply inadequate to
reduce
routine
administrative ground movement in a period of heightened IED threat
and
to conduct
helicopter‑borne operations. The GOC has to personally
authorise
coach moves
and the FP [force protection] measures required for even the
short
move
between BAS [Basra Air Station] and SLB [Shaibah Logistics Base]
requires
several
Coys [companies] to deploy to minimise the risk of a mass
casualty
attack …
This is exacerbated by an increasing number of aviation tasks in
support
524
Minute
PSO/CDS to PS/SofS [MOD], 25 November 2005, ‘CDS Visit to Iraq –
22‑24 Nov 05’.
525
Report
Dutton to CJO, 12 December 2005, ‘June to December 2005 – Hauldown
Report’.
167