The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“The
support of key allies such as Kuwait cannot be counted on in the
absence
of some
serious ground‑work by the US.”
•
“The key
point is how to get through to the Americans that the success of
any
military
operation against Iraq – and protection of our fundamental
interests
in the
region – depends on devising in advance a coherent strategy
which
assesses
the political and economic as well as the military
implications.”
350.
The advice
from Mr Hoon and Mr Straw, and No.10’s reaction to the
proposal for
a Ministerial
meeting, are addressed in Section 3.3.
351.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit wrote to Mr Hoon on 3 July setting out his concerns
about the
absence of
a political context for the military plan and the dilemma for the
UK that being
drawn into
US planning potentially posed.164
352.
Sir Kevin
concluded that the UK could not count on a military campaign
being
unlikely
or, if the US went ahead, that the UK could avoid being linked to
the campaign.
353.
Sir Kevin
advised that a “credible political plan”, which addressed the
conditions for
UK
participation and moved American planning into acceptable channels
and slowed it
down, was
needed. That is set out in more detail in Section 3.3.
354.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit’s minute was sent after Mr Watkins’ letter to
Sir David Manning
had been
sent. Mr Watkins marked the letter to Mr Hoon observing
that the MOD did
not know
the views of Secretary Powell or Dr Rice; and there was a risk
“that the PM’s
conditions
will be simply sidelined”.165
355.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry that getting involved in US planning in
late June
and early
July had posed a dilemma because:
“… it was
clear … even at that stage, if one begins discussions with the
United
States on
the military track, albeit without commitment, it becomes
increasingly
difficult
to keep options open absolutely completely … [W]e made it clear to
them
that our
participation … was purely to inform British Government thinking
…
“On the one
hand, if one is drawn into discussion of timescales and details,
we
might give
misleading signals of support for military action that was not
present
at that
stage.
“On the
other hand, if we continued to stand aside, it might be too late
for us to
influence
events or meet the political requirement which might be placed on
us.”166
356.
On 9 July,
Sir Christopher Meyer advised that President Bush would
have
a military
plan on his desk before he went on holiday in August.
164
Minute
Tebbit to Secretary of State [MOD], 3 July 2002,
‘Iraq’.
165
Manuscript
comment Watkins on Minute
Tebbit to Secretary of State [MOD], 3 July 2002,
‘Iraq’.
166
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, pages 20‑21.
228