12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
of maintaining
law and order … as with any organisation, it depends on the
man
at the top
and it is the best possible news that Latif, CG 10 (IA) Div
[Commander
General
10th Division], who has proved to be worse than useless, is to be
shifted …
if we are
to get the IA right, it means accepting the risk of much greater
embedding
within IA
units. This, in turn, means not only living and training with them,
but being
prepared to
fight with them too.”1210
1317.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Lt Gen Shirreff said that
Op SINBAD:
“… failed
to achieve the security which was the original genesis of the plan,
but it
achieved
other things. I think it achieved an increased confidence among the
Iraqi
Army. It
certainly achieved a better standard, generally speaking, of Iraqi
police,
in terms of
the mechanistic boxes that needed to be ticked before Provincial
Iraqi
Control
should be established …”1211
1318.
On 25 January,
Mr Browne briefed Cabinet that, in Basra:
“… the
murder rate had reduced from over 100 to less than 30 a month,
which
compared
favourably with a number of European States and American cities.
The
kidnap rate
had been halved and polling suggested levels of confidence in
security
which would
be welcome in the UK; 90 percent of those polled felt more secure
than
a year ago;
only two percent had encountered intimidation in the last six
months.
The biggest
challenge was improvement in policing, but the police forces were
only
a couple of
percentage points below the benchmark set for transfer of
security.”1212
1319.
On 26 January,
Lt Gen Lamb produced a report on ISF capability for
Mr Blair.1213
He warned
about the problems of gifting equipment in an attempt to fix
capability gaps:
“This will
only provide, perhaps, a marginal short term difference (usually
offset
by IMOD to
compensate against other national priorities) and is, in general,
just
as likely
to exacerbate the systemic issues already present in terms of
logistic
support
e.g. through multiple vehicle fleets or weapon systems. There are
also other
additional
factors … such directed gifting is likely to received pushback from
both the
US and the
Iraqis.”
1320.
In her weekly
report dated 1 February, Dr Marsden warned that the
formation
of the new
Basra Crimes Unit (BCU) had stalled and that 400 members of the
former
SCU were
still turning up to claim wages and entering buildings designated
for the new
BCU.1214
The MOI
were yet to stop their wages and the Provincial Director of Police
was
not
engaging on the matter. She stated that MNF protection for DIA
officers travelling to
1210
Report
Shirreff, 19 January 2007, ‘Post Operational Report – Operation
TELIC, Part One: General
Officer
Commanding’s Overview’.
1211
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, page 42.
1212
Cabinet
Conclusions, 25 January 2007.
1213
Report
Lamb, 26 January 2007, ‘Iraqi Security Force (ISF) Capability –
January 07 Report for the
Prime
Minister’.
1214
Letter
Marsden to Aldred, 1 February 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly
Report’.
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