6.4 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003

aftermath - the Coalition must prevent anarchy and internecine fighting breaking

out.”530

1103. Mr Blair asked the MOD to look at three issues:

“• We need to be clear on what we are offering the Iraqi people and senior

members of the regime (those below the top 100 on the list531) – removal of the

senior hierarchy or minimising resistance or what?

• Aftermath. We have to develop a feasible plan.

• Look at the unexpected – think through the big ‘what ifs’; oil, WMD, internecine

fighting – and develop a strategy.”

1104. The author of the record added some “personal observations”, including:

“The PM came across as someone with strong convictions that this should, and

will, go ahead. He accepted the military advice being given to him, although he

still sought reassurance that all aspects had been looked into and that plans are

drawn up to deal with the unexpected or perceived worse cases. It is clear from the

three areas that he asked further work to be done on that the Phase IV part of the

plan is critical.

…

“Interestingly it was SofS [Secretary of State, Mr Hoon] who urged the PM to

exercise a degree of restraint on POTUS [the President of the United States], whom

he described as ‘going for it’. SofS expressed concern about some of the US ideas

and wanted to ensure that no irreversible damage was done to Iraq.”

1105. After the briefing by the Chiefs of Staff, Mr Rycroft informed Mr Watkins that

Mr Blair agreed that “much greater clarity about US intentions” on post-conflict issues

was needed.532 Mr Blair “would be keen to see the outcome of the Whitehall visit to

Washington next week”.533

1106. Mr Watkins instructed Mr Lee:

“… we will clearly need to use all our regular contacts with the US, in both

CENTCOM and the Pentagon. If appropriate, this [aftermath] is an issue that

Mr Hoon could himself raise with Rumsfeld in their next regular phone call

next week.”534

530 Minute MA/DCJO to MA/CJO, 15 January 2003, ‘Briefing to Prime Minister’.

531 The Inquiry has not seen any indication of what was meant by “the top 100 on the list”. It is likely

that it was a precursor to the list of 55 Iraqis featured on the “deck of cards” issued by the US military in

April 2003.

532 Letter Rycroft to Watkins, 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning’.

533 A reference to the second round of US/UK/Australia talks on post-conflict issues in Washington on

22 January.

534 Minute Watkins to DG Op Pol, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning’.

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