The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
182.
On WMD, the
note stated that:
“Neither
UNMOVIC nor any other arrangement (including bombing) will
provide
a guaranteed
way of ridding Iraq completely of WMD. A robust
UNMOVIC
presence
in-country would undoubtedly constrain Iraqi WMD activity but
not
prevent it
…
“…
Departments
do not agree whether UNMOVIC entry [in]to Iraq would be,
on
balance,
desirable or undesirable.”
183.
On the outcome
of the review of the military need for the NFZs, the note stated
that
they had
become a “target for criticism” and a “double-edged weapon”, and
that:
“The
humanitarian role for the NFZs remains valid but this is
increasingly disputed.
The
southern NFZ also plays a key role in current contingency plans for
the defence
of Kuwait,
providing tactical intelligence of Iraqi moves and a chance to
counter them
from the
air, buying time to reinforce Kuwait itself … Some are tempted to
cease
patrolling
the NFZs and focus more on other means of deterring Iraq and
defending
its
neighbours. Departments disagree on the implications of this. But
the UK and
US military
assessment is that – if
Ministers still wanted to defend Kuwait rather
than
planning on ejecting an Iraqi force which had succeeded in
occupying it –
without the
southern NFZ, the US and UK collectively would need to station
up
to three
additional armoured brigades in Kuwait, and augment
the current land-
and
sea-based strike capability (i.e. aircraft and cruise
missiles).”
184.
On the
possibility of regime change, the note stated that:
“Most US
officials, to widely varying degrees, believe that their Iraq
policy should
include the
promotion of change in the country’s Government …
“…
aggressive rhetoric on this subject tends to be counter-productive
in the region,
particularly
when it cannot be backed up by practical success.
“But
there is a case for including the promotion of change as part of
our
policy
rather than simply assuming an indefinite stalemate. Some
movement
in this
direction is likely to be essential to keep the US on board.
We
could
certainly
do more to hold out to the Iraqi people the prospect of a brighter
future
post-Saddam
– a sort of contract with Iraq. This could include a better
co-ordinated
US/UK
information campaign, and more work with the Iraqi opposition in
exile
(though
there is some scepticism over their credibility and usefulness). We
could
also
consider more support for INDICT’s campaign101
to bring
Saddam and some of
his cronies
to justice for war crimes.”
101
INDICT was
established in 1996 to campaign for the creation of an ad hoc
International Criminal
Tribunal –
similar to those established for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda –
to try leading members of
Saddam
Hussein’s regime on charges of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, including genocide and
torture.
226