The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The role of
the IIA. An early statement of intent to hand over power to an
IIA
while
helping the Iraqi people to build a democratic future “should go
down well”.
The UN
Special Co-ordinator should have veto power over the IIA’s
decisions.
•
Humanitarian
issues. UK and US efforts were substantial: “we should play
them
up in the
media”.
•
Economic
issues. After several wars and 12 years of sanctions, Iraq’s
oil
revenues
alone would not meet the “very heavy” cost of
reconstruction,
particularly
in the short term. “We need to share the burden with other
developed
countries …
But contacts with them tell us they will make their
contribution
conditional on
there being an authorising UNSC resolution for Phase
IV.”
The World
Bank would need to prepare a rigorous needs assessment, but
that
too would
probably need UN cover.533
1271.
On the UK’s
bilateral effort, the paper stated that Ms Short was considering
where
the UK
might help with the longer-term contribution to “reform and
reconstruction”. SSR
and reform
of the public administration were two areas where the UK had a
comparative
advantage.
UK public finances were “tight”. If the UK was to keep armed forces
in Iraq,
“the scope
for a major effort on reform and reconstruction will be
limited”.
1272.
The paper
stated that the UK’s Armed Forces were fully stretched and
would
need to
scale down to about a third of current levels by the autumn.
President Bush
would have
similar concerns:
“So
we both
need an exit strategy. The key
to that will be to get new Coalition
partners,
which needs
an authorising UNSCR. US/UK
officials are working up a
lobbying
strategy. But we must be realistic. The number of countries who
have real
capability
to offer is small.”
1273.
Efforts to
secure additional Coalition partners are addressed in Sections
8
and 10.1.
1274.
Mr Blair
discussed post-conflict issues with President Bush at Camp
David
on 26 and
27 March.
1275.
Mr Blair
recommended postponing the debate about what sort of
post‑conflict
resolution was required until victory was secured and the
UK
and US were in
a position of strength.
1276.
Mr Blair
and President Bush met at Camp David on 26 and 27
March.
The meeting
is addressed in more detail in Section 9.1.
1277.
At dinner on
the first evening, Mr Blair told President Bush that he did
not want
his visit
to Camp David to focus primarily on a UN resolution to deal with
post-conflict
533
Paper FCO,
25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV Issues’.
536