The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
260.
Lt Gen Pigott
advised that, “until there is greater visibility and clarity of US
intent
our work on
potential approaches to an Iraq campaign remains speculative; this
work
is
advancing but will lack definition until we engage with the US”.
There were “potential
differences
in US and UK views on the outcomes” being sought “in terms of
governance
and
WMD”.
261.
In relation to
“military contingency planning”, the “key assumption” was that
the
largest
US‑led coalition would be “along the lines of Desert Storm and that
the UK would
want to
contribute”.
262.
Three broad
options (“force packages”) had been identified, which were
“illustrative
of the
maximum potential … contribution” that the UK might be able to make
available
for any
offensive operations within given time periods:
a.
Three
months’ warning:
Deployment of a medium scale joint force –
10 warships
including a carrier, an armoured brigade, about 60 fast jets
and
associated
support. That was described as at risk of being a “token
contribution”.
The cost,
including “essential” UORs for equipping the force, was estimated
at
£500m‑£800m.
A brigade, rather than a division, would require integration
into
an allied
formation, which would “substantially” reduce the UK’s influence
on
control of
the campaign. That would be “less than our Gulf War contribution”
and
“would be
dwarfed by the likely scale of the overall effort”.
b.
Six months’
warning:
Deployment of a large scale, war‑fighting force in
addition to
the medium scale maritime and air components, which would
be
“comparable
to the 1990/1991 conflict”, and “confer significant influence on
the
control of
the campaign”. Though the land element would be “capable of
limited
independent
war‑fighting” there would be sustainability issues. Large
numbers
of vehicles
could become “unserviceable” and there would be reliance on
others
to supply
ammunition and other stock. There would not be enough time
for
“the
procurement and fitting of all
UOR
equipment considered to be essential
for
operations in the Gulf (such as the desertisation of all armoured
vehicles)”,
which would
generate further operational risks and result in the degradation
of
the
“credibility of the UK’s contribution as [the] campaign unfolded”.
That option
would
require the call‑out of 5,000‑10,000 reservists and cost
£800m‑£1.1bn.
A decision
would need to be taken immediately for operations to begin
in
December
2002.
c.
Nine
months’ warning: The force
package would be the same as (b) but would
be better
prepared and carry fewer risks, as a result of additional training
and
equipment.
The package would have “enough capability and sustainability
to
be a
credible contribution to any coalition”. The cost would be £100m
higher
because of
a greater volume of UORs.
263.
Deployment and
campaign costs would be additional to the costs identified
for
each
option.
214