8 | The
invasion
188.
On 25
March, Mr Blair raised the need for a media campaign to
convince the
Iraqi
people that the regime would collapse with President
Bush.
189.
Concerns
were also emerging about negative press reporting of the
progress
of the
campaign.
190.
A debate
began about whether the fall of Basra should be given priority as
a
way to
contribute to the fall of the regime in Baghdad.
191.
Adm Boyce told
the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 25 March that overcoming
the
resistance
of Iraqi irregulars in az-Zubayr would provide a good indication of
how Basra
should be
tackled.125
The fall of
Basra would send a strong message, particularly when
combined
with efforts to provide humanitarian relief to its inhabitants. But
the bad
weather was
likely to slow the advance on Baghdad.
192.
A minute to
Sir David Manning, reporting the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 25
March,
stated that
the Royal Marines were patrolling Umm Qasr in berets but
that:
“Basra
remains a conundrum: the commander of 1[UK] Div [Maj Gen Brims]
has
yet to
decide how best to proceed but planning for a number of options
continues.
Situation
should be clarified over the next 24 hours.” 126
193.
The Chiefs of
Staff also discussed media issues. The minutes record a view
that:
“…
reporting from journalists in theatre gave a rather bleak outlook.
Consideration
would be
given to providing military context briefs to the embedded press
corps and,
separately,
to the ‘talking heads’ and opinion formers in
London.” 127
194.
After the
Chiefs’ discussion, Mr Ian Lee, MOD Director General
Operational Policy,
wrote to
Sir Kevin Tebbit and Adm Boyce, recording that he had pursued three
themes
identified
as:
•
the balance
in media reporting and the need for a media programme which
did
not give
the appearance that the Government was “rattled”;
•
the
information operations view of the “Basra/Baghdad relationship”;
and
•
the
“targeting of dual use communication media
facilities”.128
195.
On information
operations (IO), Mr Lee stated:
“… we
discussed the strategic IO significance of Basra. In sum, the IO
advice was
that the
road to Baghdad leads through Basra. Not only would satisfactory
removal
of regime
elements from Basra send a message to Baghdad, it would have
the
beneficial
side effect (NB not
an
objective) of pacifying the impatient media.”
125
Minutes, 25
March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
126
Minute
Gibbons to Manning, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: COS Tuesday 25
March’.
127
Minutes, 25
March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
128
Minute Lee
to PS/PUS [MOD], PSO/CDS, 25 March 2003, ‘TELIC: Information
Campaign’.
33