3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
“The Prime
Minister is adamant that they [the records] should not be
circulated to
anyone
except the Foreign Secretary.
“Nevertheless
I am clear that you and Christopher must have sight of
them.
I therefore
enclose a set, together with the Note for No.10’s internal
consumption of
the Prime
Minister’s call to the President on Wednesday. Please hold all very
tightly.”
520.
In a
discussion with Mr Straw on 5 August, Secretary Powell informed him
that
he had
seen Mr Blair’s Note to President Bush.206
521.
Sir David
Manning sent copies of Mr Blair’s Note to President Bush and
the
records of
his own conversations in Washington to Sir Michael Jay on 7
August.207
Sir David
informed Sir Michael that copies had already been sent on a
personal basis
to Mr
Straw, Sir Christopher Meyer and Sir Richard Dearlove. Mr Blair was
“adamant
that these
papers should not be circulated” although he had agreed that Mr
Straw and
Sir Michael
should have a set. Copies should be held “very tightly”. Mr
Ricketts had seen
the
documents but did not have a copy: “Absolutely no reference should
be made to
them to
anyone else in Whitehall.”
522.
Sir David
informed Sir Michael Jay that Mr Blair and Mr Bush had agreed to
set
up small
working groups “to examine the feasibility of the UN/ultimatum
route” and report
by the end
of August. Mr Ricketts had agreed that Mr Chaplin would take that
forward.
Sir David
wrote that he had “explained, in general terms” what was happening
to
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, but Sir Jeremy had “not seen the records”. A meeting
between
Mr Blair
and President Bush was being planned for early
September.
523.
There is no
evidence that Mr Hoon, Lord Goldsmith or the Cabinet Secretary
were
informed of
the Note from Mr Blair to President Bush or the subsequent
discussions.
524.
Although Mr
Blair had proposed a strategy based on an ultimatum
calling on
Iraq to permit the return of inspectors or face the consequences
to
President Bush
at Crawford, by mid-July 2002 little progress had been
made.
525.
By July,
the UK Government had concluded that President Bush
was
impatient
to move on Iraq. It was concerned that the US Administration
was
contemplating
military action in circumstances where it would be very
difficult
for the
UK to participate in or, conceivably, to support that
action.
206
Letter
Davies to Manning, 5 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.
207
Letter
Manning to Jay, 7 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.
89