7 | Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning

to establish evidence of an Iraqi breach, to persuade opinion of the case for action and

to finalise the strategy with President Bush at the end of January.

137. The UK objectives were published in a Written Ministerial Statement by Mr Straw

on 7 January.53 The “prime objective” was:

“… to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their associated

programmes and means of delivery, including prohibited ballistic missiles … as set

out in UNSCRs [UN Security Council resolutions]. This would reduce Iraq’s ability

to threaten its neighbours and the region, and prevent Iraq using WMD against its

own people. UNSCRs also require Iraq to renounce terrorism, and return captured

Kuwaitis and property taken from Kuwait.”

138. Lord Goldsmith gave Mr Blair his draft advice on 14 January that resolution 1441

would not by itself authorise the use of military force.54

139. Mr Blair agreed on 17 January to deploy a UK division with three combat brigades

for possible operations in southern Iraq.55

140. There was no collective discussion of the decision by senior Ministers.

141. In January 2003, there was a clear divergence between the UK and US

Government positions over the timetable for military action, and the UK became

increasingly concerned that US impatience with the inspections process would

lead to a decision to take unilateral military action in the absence of support for

such action in the Security Council.

142. On 23 January, Mr Blair was advised that the US military would be ready for action

in mid-February.56

143. In a Note to President Bush on 24 January, Mr Blair wrote that the arguments

for proceeding with a second Security Council resolution, “or at the very least a

clear statement” from Dr Blix which allowed the US and UK to argue that a failure

to pass a second resolution was in breach of the spirit of 1441, remained in his view,

overwhelming; and that inspectors should be given until the end of March or early April

to carry out their task.57

144. Mr Blair suggested that, in the absence of a “smoking gun”, Dr Blix would be able

to harden up his findings on the basis of a pattern of non-co-operation from Iraq and that

that would be sufficient for support for military action in the Security Council.

53 House of Commons, Official Report, 7 January 2003, columns 4-6WS.

54 Minute [Draft] [Goldsmith to Prime Minister], 14 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Interpretation of Resolution 1441’.

55 Letter Manning to Watkins, 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land Contribution’.

56 Letter PS/C to Manning, 23 January 2003, [untitled].

57 Letter Manning to Rice, 24 January 2003, [untitled], attaching Note [Blair to Bush], [undated], ‘Note’.

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