7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
346.
Asked if “a
war in Iraq would aggravate the threat from whatever source
to
the United
Kingdom”, Baroness Manningham-Buller stated that that was the
view
communicated
by the JIC Assessments.168
347.
Baroness
Manningham-Buller subsequently added that if Ministers had read
the
JIC
Assessments they could “have had no doubt” about that
risk.169
She said
that by the
time of the
July 2005 attacks in London:
“… an
increasing number of British-born individuals … were attracted to
the ideology
of Usama
Bin Laden and saw the West’s activities in Iraq and Afghanistan
as
threatening
their fellow religionists and the Muslim world.”
348.
Asked whether
the judgement that the effect of the invasion of Iraq had
increased
the
terrorist threat to the UK was based on hard evidence or a broader
assessment,
Baroness
Manningham-Buller replied:
“I think we
can produce evidence because of the numerical evidence of the
number
of plots,
the number of leads, the number of people identified, and the
correlation of
that to
Iraq and statements of people as to why they were involved … So I
think the
answer to
your … question: yes.”170
349.
In its request
for a statement, the Inquiry asked Mr Blair if he had read the
JIC
Assessment
of 10 February 2002, and what weight he had given to it when
he decided
to take
military action.171
350.
In his
statement Mr Blair wrote:
“I was
aware of the JIC Assessment of 10 February that the Al Qaida
threat to the
UK would
increase. But I took the view then and take the same view now that
to
have backed
down because of the threat of terrorism would be completely
wrong.
In any
event, following 9/11 and Afghanistan we were a terrorist target
and, as recent
events in
Europe and the US show, irrespective of Iraq, there are ample
justifications
such
terrorists will use as excuses for terrorism.”172
351.
The UK’s
relationship with the US was a determining factor in the
Government’s
decisions
over Iraq.
352.
It was the US
Administration which decided in late 2001 to make dealing with
the
problem of
Saddam Hussein’s regime the second priority, after the ousting of
the Taliban
168
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, page 31.
169
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, page 33.
170
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 33-34.
171
Inquiry
request for a witness statement, 13 December 2010, Qs 11c and
11d page 7.
172
Statement,
14 January 2011, page 16.
617