The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

“As a result of the operation in Basra, which is now complete, the Iraq forces now

have the primary role for security in most parts of the city. It is still a difficult and

sometimes dangerous place, but many extremists have been arrested or have left

the city. The reported levels of murder and kidnapping are significantly down …

“What all this means is not that Basra is how we want it to be but that the next

chapter in Basra’s history can be written by the Iraqis …

“The British forces that remain in Iraq will have the following tasks:

• training and support to Iraqi forces;

• securing the Iraq‑Iran border;

• securing supply routes;

• and, above all, the ability to conduct operations against extremist groups and

be there in support of the Iraqi Army when called upon.

“Over time, and depending naturally on progress and the capability of the Iraq

security forces, we will be able to draw down further, possibly to below 5,000 once

the Basra Palace site has been transferred to the Iraqis in late summer.”1241

1348. The paper produced by the IPU and British Embassy Baghdad on 16 February

2007 described problems with Basra’s judicial system.1242 There was “considerable

evidence of the extra‑legal influence of political/religious factions on the judicial process”.

Those judges involved in combating corruption had expressed concern for their personal

safety and there was a lack of judicial control.

1349. The paper included a recommendation that attempts to bring prosecutions in

IPS corruption cases should continue. A new Basra courthouse would be completed

by November 2007 and a 1,500‑capacity prison would be created in Basra. Those

conclusions were reflected in the Better Basra Mark III plan (described later in this

Section).

1350. On 26 February, in response to the latest weekly report from Dr Marsden, No.10

wrote to departments:

“The Prime Minister is seized of the need to replace [Brigadier] Hamadi as Director

of Basra Police. We need to take urgent action with Maliki to underline the case

for this, and to ensure the effective functioning of the Serious Crimes Unit. The

Prime Minister thinks this may require a high level visit, from the Foreign or

1241 House of Commons, Official Report, 21 February 2007, columns 261‑280.

1242 Letter Siddiq to Banner, 16 February 2007 attaching Paper British Embassy Baghdad/Iraq Policy Unit,

‘Iraqi Justice System’.

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