6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
969.
AM Burridge
wrote in his Hauldown Report in early May:
“Our
overriding consideration was for the GOC [Maj Gen Brims] to
condition his
own AO, in
preparation for stability operations (Phase IV), rather than
inherit
circumstances
[created by others] …”416
970.
Mr Blair
held a meeting with Mr John Prescott (the Deputy Prime
Minister),
Mr Hoon,
Lord Goldsmith, Adm Boyce, Sir Andrew Turnbull and No.10 staff on
11 March
to discuss
legal and military issues.417
Mr Straw
attended part of the meeting.
971.
The meeting is
addressed in more detail in Sections 3.8 and 6.2.
972.
The briefing
note for Mr Blair stated that the “main purpose of the
meeting” was
confirmation
of the viability of the overall military plan.418
Questions
for Mr Blair to raise
included
whether the US had a “winning concept” and what conditions UK
forces should
expect in
Basra.
973.
Adm Boyce told
the meeting he was “confident that the battle plan would
work”.419
974.
Asked about
that statement and whether it included the aftermath, Lord Boyce
told
the
Inquiry: “No, not in that statement.”420
975.
After the
meeting, Mr Watkins sent Sir David Manning an outline of the
military
plan for
Iraq and advice on decisions needed on the development of the UK’s
role (see
976.
On the
question of the expansion of the UK AO northwards, Mr Watkins
explained:
“The US
Land Component Commander has … developed a plan that would
expand
the UK Area
of Operations by up to 150km up to and beyond al-Amara [in
Maysan
province]
(but short of al-Kut [in Wasit province]) …
“The case
for pushing a UK formation northwards will ultimately have to be
judged
at the
time. Clearly it will depend to some extent on what is happening in
the
Basra area.
It is also the case that an exemplary Phase IV operation depends
on
a
satisfactory conclusion to the conflict phase. The Defence
Secretary therefore
judges that
the senior UK operational commander (the Chief of Joint
Operations)
should be
authorised to expand the Phase III Area of Operations northwards
if
that is
required to achieve a satisfactory outcome to Phase III. The focus
for the
UK in Phase
IV should, however, remain the South-Eastern Area of
Operations
as currently
understood.”
416
Report
Burridge to CJO, 8 May 2003, ‘NCC Operation Telic Hauldown Report:
07 Feb 03 – 08 May 03’.
417
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Legal and Military
Aspects’.
418
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq Military: 1300
Meeting’.
419
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Legal and Military
Aspects’.
420
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 85.
421
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: the Military
Plan’.
487