The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
28.
The draft
paper recommended an early approach to a new US Administration.
Both
US
Presidential candidates had limited their freedom of movement by
stressing that
they wanted
to see sanctions tightened. The UK’s “pitch” should be that
implementation
of
resolution 1284 best served US and UK interests, and that the
status quo was
not
sustainable:
“Support
for the UK/US approach is diminishing. Our position in the Security
Council
is
weakening over time … UK/US policy remains deeply unpopular at
street level.
No matter
how big the ‘Oil-for-Food’ programme may become, it is
cumbersome
and
bureaucratic and will never be able to redress the deterioration of
Iraq’s
infrastructure,
the impoverishment of the middle classes and the stifling of
normal
economic
activity. For as long as sanctions remain in place, responsibility
for the
humanitarian
situation will be ascribed to the US and the UK.”
29.
The draft
paper concluded:
“Containment,
but a looser version, remains the best option for achieving our
policy
objectives
towards Iraq. International support is vital if this is to be
sustained.
SCR 1284
delivered the balanced package envisaged in the May 1999 DOP
paper.
Need for
some tactical adjustments to make policy sustainable in the
medium
term.
Adjustments to the southern NFZ will be a key element. The US need
to be
convinced
that we are better served with UNMOVIC [UN Monitoring,
Verification
and
Inspection Commission] inside Iraq with sanctions suspended than by
the
status quo.
Other alternatives remain unattractive at this stage.”
30.
The draft
paper considered other strategic options, including “regime
overthrow”. It
stated that
this option “would command no useful international support” and
commented:
“The US
support for overthrow allows Iraq to claim with some justification
that there
is no point
in complying with the SCRs as the US will never lift sanctions
while
Saddam
remains in power.”
31.
The draft
paper also set out the difficulties in sustaining the
NFZs:
“Elements
both here and in the US Government consider the zones
largely
ineffective,
dangerous and presentationally damaging. Our legal basis is
tenuous
and we run
the risk of a case against us at the ICJ [International Court of
Justice].
It is also
inconceivable that Iraq will accept UNMOVIC [inspections] without
a
deal on the
NFZs.
“There are
grounds unconnected with implementation of [resolution] 1284
to
consider
with the US withdrawing from the southern NFZ. But we could not
avoid
the charge
that this was a retreat, unless it could be presented as being in
response
to a
positive gesture from Iraq … Otherwise, we would justify it on the
grounds that
UNMOVIC
would not be able to operate safely and effectively in Iraq if the
current
level of
confrontation was maintained; that we had other means of monitoring
the
196