The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
After the
attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 and the fall of the
Taliban
regime in
Afghanistan in November, the US Administration turned its attention
to
regime
change in Iraq as part of the second phase of what it called the
Global War
on
Terror.
2.
The UK
Government sought to influence the decisions of the US
Administration
and avoid
unilateral US military action on Iraq by offering partnership to
the US
and seeking
to build international support for the position that Iraq was a
threat
with which
it was necessary to deal.
3.
In
Mr Blair’s view, the decision to stand “shoulder to shoulder”
with the US
was an
essential demonstration of solidarity with the UK’s principal ally
as well
as being
in the UK’s long-term national interests.
4.
To do so
required the UK to reconcile its objective of disarming Iraq, if
possible
by peaceful
means, with the US goal of regime change. That was achieved
by
the
development of an ultimatum strategy threatening the use of force
if Saddam
Hussein did
not comply with the demands of the international community, and
by
seeking to
persuade the US to adopt that strategy and pursue it through the
UN.
5.
President
Bush’s decision, in September 2002, to challenge the UN to deal
with
Iraq, and
the subsequent successful negotiation of resolution 1441 giving
Iraq
a final
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations or face
serious
consequences
if it did not, was perceived to be a major success for
Mr Blair’s
strategy
and his influence on President Bush.
6.
But US
willingness to act through the UN was limited. Following the
Iraqi
declaration
of 7 December 2002, the UK perceived that President Bush
had
decided
that the US would take military action in early 2003 if Saddam
Hussein
had not
been disarmed and was still in power.
7.
The timing
of military action was entirely driven by the US
Administration.
8.
At the end
of January 2003, Mr Blair accepted the US timetable for
military
action by
mid-March. President Bush agreed to support a second
resolution
to help
Mr Blair.
9.
The UK
Government’s efforts to secure a second resolution faced
opposition
from those
countries, notably France, Germany and Russia, which
believed
that the
inspections process could continue. The inspectors reported that
Iraqi
co‑operation,
while far from perfect, was improving.
10.
By early
March, the US Administration was not prepared to allow
inspections
to continue
or give Mr Blair more time to try to achieve support for
action.
The attempt
to gain support for a second resolution was abandoned.
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