The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

48. Lt Gen Cooper commented that the key question was “what, or where, next?”.

Both the MNF and Iraqi Government were turning their attention to Maysan, in an

attempt to disrupt Iranian operations and address militia infiltration of the police.

49. On 23 May, Mr McDonald wrote a report for Mr Brown of his meeting with Mr Hadley

and his team in Washington two days previously to discuss troop levels.15 Mr McDonald

described the meeting as “hard pounding” and reported that the US had been concerned

about how UK troop reductions would be described and about reports that the UK was

planning to reduce rapidly to 1,000 or fewer.

50. Mr McDonald explained UK military advice that “there was no sustainable

combat deployment between 3,350 and zero”, which Mr Hadley suggested should be

re‑examined in light of the improved security situation in Basra, and that key tasks would

be complete by year end.

51. Mr McDonald said that: “The British Parliament and public were expecting British

troop numbers to fall to 2,500 this year.” He asked whether US forces would be able

to take on any tasks that would allow UK numbers to fall to that level. General Doug

Lute (“the US War Czar”) said that the US would look at that. They agreed to continue

discussions in advance of President Bush’s visit to the UK from 15 to 16 June.

52. Mr Brown and President Bush discussed Iraq briefly by video conference on

30 May.16 Mr Brown reported that Mr Browne had returned from his recent visit to Basra

feeling more optimistic and said that the UK must focus more clearly on its tasks for the

remainder of 2008.

53. Mr Brown also confirmed that his “rough objective” was to draw down to 2,500 UK

troops by the end of the year.

54. In his weekly report on 30 May, Maj Gen White-Spunner reported that the people

of Basra “remain firmly behind” the ISF and Iraqi Government, as their quality of life

had significantly improved following the end of militia dominance.17 MND(SE)’s weekly

security assessment of the city showed that all but one of the districts was stable or

improving. Basra’s night-life was returning, illustrated by restaurants opening again at

night, the return of music to the streets and even the selling of alcohol.

55. Food and fuel prices, which had increased sharply during the early stages of the

Charge of the Knights, had returned to normal. However, the militias continued low‑level

attacks against the Iraqi Police Service and soft targets (such as music shops or

weddings) and the Special Groups continued to target the MNF. Phase XI of the Charge

of the Knights, targeted at Abu Al Khasib and the al-Faw Peninsula, was due to begin

on 31 May.

15 Minute McDonald to Prime Minister, 23 May 2008, ‘Iraq: US Views on UK Force Level Plans’.

16 Letter Fletcher to Gould, 30 May 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with US President, 30 May’.

17 Minute White-Spunner to CJO, 30 May 2008, ‘MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 29 May 2008’.

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