10.1 | Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

622. The Inquiry asked Mr Bearpark if the UK’s assumption of “lead responsibility” for

the South had given rise to an American assumption that the UK would provide a higher

level of financing for CPA(South) than it did.343 Mr Bearpark said that at a senior level the

US believed that the UK was making a “reasonable and fair contribution” in the South,

in terms of both personnel and funding. There was a problem, however, at the “middle

level”, which was exacerbated by repeated stories in the UK media that the US could

learn from the exemplary job that the UK was doing in the South:

“A result of that was that … there were certainly American officials within

CPA(Baghdad) who would say to me, ‘Look, why are you coming whinging at us yet

again … to try to get some resources for CPA(South)? You Brits know how to do it

so well, why don’t you fund it as well, if you are that clever about it?’”

623. Mr Bearpark also told the Inquiry that, while in theory his responsibilities included

staffing, life support and the flow of funds to all CPA regional offices, in practice there

was “a big difference between CPA(South) … and the other CPA regional offices,

because CPA(South) was British and run in a particular way … as a British operation”.344

624. Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Inquiry:

“… I think we did a good job in the early stages in Basra. But we [the UK] were

very short of money, and we got virtually no American money because DFID

concentrated on that. The Americans said let the Brits look after Basra.”345

625. Security in Iraq deteriorated in August 2003. Concerns about progress on

reconstruction in the South and the implications for the level of consent enjoyed by

UK forces led the UK to develop the Essential Services Plan, which aimed to improve

essential services rapidly and visibly.

626. On 10 and 11 August, Basra experienced severe rioting.346 Mr Richmond reported:

“The immediate cause of the disturbances is clear. Supplies of petrol and diesel in

Basra’s service stations ran out on 9 August … This was combined with a major

blackout in Basra because of a failure in the transmission line which rippled through

the entire system. (The system is so fragile that the only surprise is that it has not

happened before.)

“There is no doubt that political elements … exploited the situation … There is also

some evidence of pre-planning … But without the fuel and electricity crisis agitators

would not have found much purchase.”

343 Public hearing, 6 July 2010, page 75.

344 Public hearing, 6 July 2012, pages 5 and 7.

345 Private hearing, 26 May 2010, page 54.

346 Telegram 114 IraqRep to FCO London, 12 August 2003, ‘Situation in Basra’.

109