The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“The
economy is moving forward. You have before you the prospect of a
sovereign
government
in a few months.
“With the
arrest of Saddam Hussein, there is a new opportunity for the
members of
the former
regime to end their bitter opposition.”
617.
Mr Blair
spoke to President Bush by telephone on 14 December and
encouraged
him to push
“the Sunni strategy” when commenting publicly on the capture later
that
day.349
The tone
should be focused on reconciliation.
618.
During Defence
Questions on 15 December, Mr Hoon told Parliament
that:
“A crucial
component of our efforts in Iraq is the training of Iraqi security
forces.
That has
been given added impetus by the acceleration of the political
timetable
agreed by
the Iraqi Governing Council on 15 November. To accelerate the rate
of
training,
there is a requirement for an additional infantry battalion and a
contingent
of Royal
Military Police. The House will recall that I have previously
announced
the
earmarking of a ready battalion for deployment on surge operations
for that
reason. I
have decided that that battalion, the 1st Battalion the Argyll and
Sutherland
Highlanders,
and two platoons of Royal Military Police, drawn from 101 and
156
provost
companies should deploy in January for six months.”350
619.
Briefing
produced for Mr Hoon suggested the following
line:
“Of course
we would welcome additional contributions to the Multi-National
effort
in Iraq.
But we can sustain our current force levels, and indeed temporary
‘surges’
such as the
additional deployments I am announcing today. Our approach to Iraq
is
not driven
by any sort of arbitrary targets for reducing our force levels
there.”351
620.
On 16
December, Mr Tim Dowse, Chief of the Assessments Staff,
provided a note
for
discussion at a JIC meeting the following day.352
621.
The purpose of
the paper was to identify the main challenges to the
Coalition’s
plans for
political transition. Among the risks it identified to achieving
the various
milestones
in the transition timetable, were:
•
The lack of
security – this was judged to be the most serious threat to
progress.
•
Opposition
from Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, who was concerned to
ensure
proper
recognition for the role of Islam within the Fundamental Law and
who
349
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 14 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Capture of Saddam:
Conversation with Bush,
14 December’.
350
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 15
December 2003, column 1302.
351
Email
Iraq-sec 2 to SOFS-Private Office, 15 December 2003, ‘Additional
NATO Lines’ attaching
Note MOD
[junior official], [untitled].
352
Minute
Dowse, 16 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Threats to Political Transition –
JIC Discussion Note’
attaching
Note [unattributed], 16 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Threats to Political
Transition’.
310