The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
to make
the UK paper into a smaller clone of […] … I would tend towards
relying
on quality
…”
•
The MOD
suggested “Further to your request to make the public paper
more
exciting”,
text describing facilities which had “potential applicable to
production
of the
prohibited long-range missile that Iraq is known to be developing”,
and a
reference
to “concerted efforts to acquire additional manufacturing
technology
for its
missile programmes” with some items “inevitably” slipping through
the
95.
On 19 August,
Ms Jane Hamilton-Eddy, one of the Deputy Heads of the
Assessments
Staff, sent a further draft of the dossier to the DIS. She wrote
that
Mr Scarlett
had recently reviewed the document, and made changes. The
presentation
of the CBW
sections had been revised “to bring out more clearly our
judgements”
although
the text itself was “not new”.43
Mr Scarlett
was also:
“…
particularly keen to include examples of suspicious facilities, so
can I ask that
we look
closely at the relevant areas to see if anything more can be
said.”
96.
Ms
Hamilton-Eddy added that the aim was to have the revised document
ready
“by the
end of the summer break”.
97.
While the
revised draft largely contained the same material as the draft sent
to
Sir David
Manning by Mr McKane on 21 June (see Section 4.1), there were
a small
number of
additions.44
Those
included:
•
In relation
to the material for which the inspectors had been unable to
account,
Iraq’s
“declarations to UNSCOM [UN Special Commission] deliberately
obscure
the
picture”.
•
“Iraq’s
military forces maintain the capability to use these weapons,
with
command,
control and logistical arrangements in place.”
•
“Facilities
of concern include the Castor Oil Production Plant at
Habbinayah,
which could
be used in the production of ricin … and the Al-Dawrah Foot
and
Mouth
Disease Vaccine Plant, which was involved in BW agent
production
before the
Gulf War.”
•
Details of
the possible delivery means for chemical and biological
agents.
•
“Following
the expulsion of weapons inspectors in 1998 Iraq has
increased
[covert
efforts to acquire technology and materials with nuclear
applications].
There is
compelling evidence that Iraq has sought the supply of
significant
quantities
of uranium from Africa.”
42
Email
[1806] [MOD junior official] to [Assessments Staff junior
official], 9 August 2002, ‘Re: Dossier –
missile
sites’.
43
Minute
Hamilton-Eddy to [DIS junior official], 19 August 2002, ‘Iraq
Public Dossier’.
44
Minute [DIS
junior official] to [DIS junior official], 30 August 2002 attaching
‘Iraq Public Dossier’ Paper
[Cabinet
Office], [undated], ‘Iraqi WMD Programmes’.
130