The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
inflation;
•
trade and
capital flows;
•
public
finances and monetary policy;
•
structural
policies and economic philosophy;
•
northern
Iraq; and
•
long-term
planning.
23.
From early
2002, UK diplomats based in Amman began to visit Iraq more
often.
They
produced reports on political and social developments, drawing on
information
gleaned
from business and other travellers and monthly UN briefings in
Baghdad.14
24.
The FCO has
not been able to provide the Inquiry with the complete series
of
reports
between July 1998 and March 2003.
25.
Dr Robert
Wilson and Mr Mark Hetherington, the two research analysts
working
on Iraq
before the invasion, explained to the Inquiry that the FCO drew on
a range of
sources for
information about the social, economic and political situation in
Iraq:
“These
included Iraqi politicians and exiles from both Iraqi Kurdistan and
the rest
of the
country, contact with whom was one of the core tasks of Research
Analysts
during this
period. Amongst those were individuals who visited either
Saddam-
controlled
Iraq or Northern Iraq (where Saddam had withdrawn his
administration
and which
was under de facto control of the two main Kurdish parties) and
those
who had
links to family or contacts within the country. Though the majority
of those
with whom
we were in contact were opposed to Saddam Hussein’s regime,
their
analysis
was far from homogenous – religious organisations and NGOs in
particular
offering
more nuanced analysis. Of course we were aware that many of
these
individuals
had their own particular agenda – especially when it came to the
question
of what
level of political support their parties or ideologies had within
Iraq, and this
was hard to
assess independently. In addition there were many Iraqis who
shied
away from
contact with the British Government …”15
26.
Dr Wilson told
the Inquiry that RA had “no shortage of information on Iraq of
varying
degrees of
reliability”.16
In addition
to Iraqi exiles, the FCO’s network of Embassies in
the region
(particularly in Jordan and Turkey) kept in touch with local Iraqi
officials and
opinion
formers. Though most contacts were opposed to Saddam Hussein’s
regime,
their
analysis was far from homogeneous.17
Researchers
were aware their contacts had
their own
agendas and it was hard to assess independently what support
specific parties
or
ideologies had in Iraq.
14
Teleletter
Amman [junior official] to MED [junior official] 24 January 2002,
‘Iraq: our interests’.
15
Statement
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Research Analysts, 23 November
2009.
16
Briefing
Wilson, November 2009.
17
Statement
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Research Analysts, 23 November
2009.
118