The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
359.
On
12 June, Mr Straw told Cabinet that the ISG was starting
work. Incentives and
immunities
to encourage Iraqi co-operation were being sorted
out.173
360.
There is no
record in the minutes that Mr Straw explained the UK’s role
or
responsibilities
to Cabinet.174
361.
Sir Richard
Dearlove sent Sir David Manning a copy of the letter to
Mr Tenet
362.
In a covering
letter to Sir David Manning, Sir Richard suggested:
“With CIA
in the ISG driving seat on WMD, SIS will need to take a more
prominent
role in the
co-ordination of the UK effort, as we are best placed to liaise
with CIA
here, in
Washington and on the ground in Iraq.”
363.
Depending on
what Mr Tenet told Sir Richard about command, control
and
communications
arrangements for the ISG, it might be necessary to “re-jig” the
Whitehall
arrangements
on WMD to reflect a more prominent SIS role. Any changes would need
to
avoid
detracting from the “key contribution of DIS/MOD, who are providing
the major UK
input of
resources and expertise, here and in the field”.
364.
Sir Richard
suggested setting “some review deadlines”, with a first review at
the
end of July
to assess the impact of the joint SIS/DIS “surge effort” and the
interface
between
that effort and the start of the ISG. He suggested a date around
the end of
September
for a first formal review of the ISG.
365.
Sir Richard
commented:
“Although
the UK will be the junior partner in the ISG, and we may need to
manage
expectations
on both sides of the Atlantic about what it can achieve, I hope
that we
will be
able to influence its focus and pace of activity.”
366.
Sir David
Manning endorsed Sir Richard Dearlove’s proposals and
asked
Sir Richard
to discuss the streamlining of Whitehall machinery with
Mr Scarlett.176
Sir David
envisaged the JIC Sub-Committee on Iraq/WMD remaining the focal
point
for the
overall Whitehall effort, “but it will clearly need to work very
closely with the
SIS/CIA
liaison machinery”.
367.
SIS3 reported,
after visiting Iraq in June, that logistical obstacles were likely
to
delay ISG
operation until mid-July.177
He had
observed some confusion on the ground
as a
consequence of recent leadership changes and some “institutional
rivalries and
disconnects”,
confirming SIS3 in the view that the UK should reinforce its
independent
173
Cabinet
Conclusions, 12 June 2003.
174
Cabinet
Conclusions, 12 June 2003.
175
Letter C to
Manning, 16 June 2003, [untitled].
176
Letter
Manning to C, 17 June 2003, ‘Iraq: ISG’.
177
Letter SIS3
to Manning, 19 June 2003, ‘Iraq: WMD’.
492