9.5  |  June 2006 to 27 June 2007

• Is intended to be closely co‑ordinated with developmental effort (Better Basra)

and assist the implementation of the Iraqi Basra Security Plan, will have a strong

and visible Iraqi face and requires strong Iraqi political support;

• Assumes no presence of high‑visibility US assets, though may seek assistance

with intelligence gathering;

• Requires an uplift in personnel for up to four months …”

137.  The advice gave a broad outline of the plan:

“The city is divided into segments characterised by the level of consent for MNF and

ISF. Taking each segment in turn a security pulse is applied for up to 48 hours, which

may include increased patrolling by ISF and MNF, car bans and curfews, and may

be accompanied by surgical detention operations against key targets. The follow on

activity focuses on SSR of the IPS and DBE [Department of Border Enforcement],

and localised reconstruction using Iraqi contractors and lasts for about 30 days,

during which security is provided by an IA [Iraqi Army] framework operation …

“A key ingredient in the operation will be PM Maliki’s support for operations against

rogue elements of the JAM. To this end, Secretary of State is requested to discuss

this point with Maliki during his visit, highlighting the need for his concurrence and

active support, despite the potential local backlash.”

138.  Mr Browne deferred his decision on the uplift of troops until after he had been

updated during his visit to Iraq.98

139.  Mr Browne visited Baghdad from 27 to 29 August and then travelled to Basra.99

In Baghdad, “interlocutors detected an improvement in Basra security and the role

of MND(SE) in achieving this”. The British Embassy Baghdad observed “the note of

optimism, albeit cautious … was striking. It reflects the early successes of the BdSP

[Baghdad Security Plan] and a sense that the plan mapped out is achievable.”

140.  Mr Browne met the Defence and Interior Ministers and Prime Minister Maliki, who

“expressed delight” when talked through the projects MND(SE) was about to launch and

confirmed that Maj Gen Hamadi reported directly to him and was not subordinate to the

Governor of Basra.

141.  Lt Gen Fry’s tour as SBMR‑I concluded at the end of August.100 His end of tour

report made clear the challenges and risks that lay ahead and reflected on progress

made since 2003:

“Hubris and nemesis in the early part of the US campaign, but they now have a firm

grip on COIN [counter‑insurgency] operations under Casey’s leadership. MND(SE)

in good shape though complications may arise as UK forces reduce and concentrate

98  Letter Beadle to Burke‑Davies, 5 September 2006, ‘Iraq: Op Salamanca’.

99  eGram 37962/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 31 August 2006, ‘Iraq: Visit by Defence Minister’.

100  Minute Fry to PSO/CDS, 28 August 2006, ‘SBMR‑I End of Tour Report’.

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