10.1 | Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

• DFID maintained daily contact with the ICRC and UN agencies, but almost all

other interventions, including deployment of DFID humanitarian advisers into

Iraq, were awaiting an improvement in security. The ICRC was the only agency

to have been in Iraq throughout the conflict: UN agencies and NGOs were

awaiting their own security assessments before deploying widely. ORHA,

which had “a very limited capability to deliver humanitarian assistance”, was

similarly constrained.46

68. The Cabinet Office round-up of events on 11 April reported that the ICRC

was “profoundly alarmed by the chaos currently prevailing in Baghdad and other parts

of Iraq”.47

69. Sir David Manning, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser, passed the Cabinet Office’s

report to Mr Blair, highlighting the ICRC’s concern.48

The Government sought to generate positive publicity for the Coalition’s humanitarian

assistance.

Mr Hoon proposed to Secretary Rumsfeld on 3 April that the Coalition needed to highlight

its humanitarian work for as long as it remained engaged in a propaganda war with the

Iraqi regime.49

Sir David Manning discussed establishing a medical “air bridge” to Baghdad with Mr Hoon

and, separately, with Dr Condoleezza Rice, US National Security Advisor, on 12 April.50

Sir David reported that he had suggested to Dr Rice that “we” should bring planes into

Baghdad packed with medical equipment and specialist medical teams.51 The initiative

would have an immediate impact on local hospitals and on Iraqi and international public

opinion. The flights should be undertaken with “much fanfare, and for the cameras”.

In practice, the initiative might not amount to much more than giving a much higher profile

to what was already happening.

Sir David suggested to Mr Simon McDonald, Mr Straw’s Principal Private Secretary, that,

if the idea prospered, “we should try to ensure that the UK is clearly associated with it.

We might send British equipment and personnel on the flights, and secure maximum

publicity for our contribution.”

Later that day, Mr Peter Watkins, Mr Hoon’s Principal Private Secretary, informed

Sir David that US and Australian aircraft loaded with medical supplies would land in

46 Letter Bewes to Rycroft, 11 April 2003, [untitled] attaching Paper DFID, 11 April 2003,

‘Iraq: Humanitarian Needs and Response’.

47 Report Cabinet Office, 11 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Evening Round Up 11 April’.

48 Manuscript comment Manning to Prime Minister, 12 April 2003, on Report Cabinet Office, 11 April 2003,

‘Iraq: Evening Round Up 11 April’.

49 Minute Watkins to DG Op Pol, 3 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Rumsfeld: 3 April 2003’.

50 Manuscript comment Manning to Prime Minister, 12 April 2003, on Letter Watkins to Manning, 12 April

2003, ‘Baghdad: Medical Support’; Letter Manning to McDonald, 12 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with

Condi Rice’.

51 Letter Manning to McDonald, 12 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.

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