4.4 | The
search for WMD
101.
The need to
manage public expectations was also discussed. The process
would
be long and
technical.
102.
Mr Dowse,
the FCO member of the UK delegation, highlighted a number of
points
to
Mr Straw, including:
“The
immediate need is to ensure that both US and UK are making best use
of
the quite
substantial specialist military assets we have in theatre now, to
pursue
the search
for evidence of WMD programmes. Our understanding is that the
UK
assets are
not being used at all in their intended roles; the (500-strong) US
75th
Exploitation
Task Force is searching sites, but largely on an opportunity basis
rather
than in
accordance with a coherent set of priorities. The commanders on the
spot
have –
understandably been focused on … [other issues]. They now need to
make
a further
gear-change, and put WMD at the top of their priorities. DCDI
[Mr Howard]
will visit
theatre early next week to make sure this message gets across to
UK
commanders.
The Americans are taking parallel action with
CENTCOM.”46
103.
Mr Dowse
reported that, contrary to the reporting telegram from Washington,
the
ISG was
expected “to roll out incrementally from the start of May”,
and:
“Subject to
Mr Hoon’s approval, MOD have agreed in principle to a UK
contingent in
the ISG of
about 100 specialist personnel, including the Chief of
Staff.”
104.
Mr Desmond
Bowen, the Deputy Head of OD Sec, held a meeting on
24 April
“to focus
on the very short term, before the ISG is fully up and running at
the end
of May”.47
He informed
Sir David Manning that three main obstacles to early
progress
had been
identified:
•
the search
for WMD not being CENTCOM’s priority and the military
operating
“in a
piecemeal fashion”;
•
poor
security, especially in Baghdad, making it difficult and dangerous
to
interview
some of those known to be involved; and
•
the absence
of incentives for scientists and others to come
forward.
105.
The meeting
produced two ideas:
•
immediate
establishment of a pilot scheme in Basra, using UK resources, to
take
advantage
of the fact that many WMD scientists were “likely to have been
Shia
and may
have gone home to the South”; and
•
development
of an incentives package.
106.
Mr Bowen
recommended a “real push” with the Americans and
offered
Sir David
Manning a note to use with Dr Rice.
46
Minute
Dowse to Private Secretary [FCO], 23 April 2003, ‘Iraq WMD:
UK/US Talks, 21-22 April’.
47
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 25 April 2003, ‘Iraq Survey
Group’.
445