The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
298.
The IPU asked
Ministers a number of specific questions, including:
•
Whether
they agreed “that the UK does not have the resources to make
an
‘exemplary’
effort in providing for basic humanitarian needs in the area
controlled
by the UK
Division”. The cost of making a “significant difference” in a UK
Area
of
Operation (AO) was estimated at between US$400m and US$2.4bn for
the
first
year.178
That was
well beyond the financial and implementing capacity of
DFID and
the MOD, and could become a significant medium‑term
commitment
if the
local population became dependent on UK assistance. The
alternative
to an
exemplary effort was to give UK assistance to UN agencies and
NGOs,
supplemented
by support for QIPs in the UK’s AO.
•
To choose
between options for a post‑conflict military presence in the
medium
term. The
cost of maintaining a military force to provide security in a
geographic
area (which
might be based on Basra) would be in the order of £1bn a
year.
•
Whether to
follow the US plan to administer Iraq as a whole and not
seek
general UK
responsibility for the administration of any geographic area
in
the medium
term. In any area where the UK took responsibility for security,
it
could, with
a UN mandate, also take on wider responsibility for
reconstruction
(including
humanitarian assistance and aspects of civil administration),
but
that would
“very likely be beyond the resources of the UK alone and
have
implications
for domestic departments”.
299.
At the 6 March
meeting:
•
Ms Short
said that the “DFID contingency fund” would prioritise Iraq. The
funding
available
to DFID would not, however, provide for a humanitarian response
on
the scale
of Kosovo. Ms Short also repeated her view that a UN mandate
was
essential
for post‑conflict humanitarian and reconstruction operations, both
to
provide
legal cover for reconstruction and to encourage other countries
and
international
organisations to participate.
•
Mr Brown
said that the military operation would be “very costly”. Estimates
for a
major
humanitarian operation were running at US$1.9bn to US$4bn. The
burden
of
reconstruction should not be borne by the US and UK alone; other
countries
and Iraqi
oil revenues should be tapped. In the longer term, Iraqi oil should
fund
the
country’s reconstruction. Mr Brown said that he was
particularly concerned
that UK
funds should not be used to repay Iraq’s substantial debts to
Germany,
France and
Russia.
•
Mr Hoon
referred to the importance of humanitarian action in the
immediate
wake of the
arrival of UK forces. Ms Short said that DFID had £70m
available
“for rapid
disbursement” on humanitarian activities.179
178
The paper
assumed that the UK’s AO would comprise Basra province and that
Basra province
contained
around 20 percent of Iraq’s population. The figures represented 20
percent of estimated total
humanitarian
costs in the first year after a conflict (US$2bn to
US$12bn)
179
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Post‑Conflict
Issues’.
492