14.1  |  Military equipment (post-conflict)

measures would provide a significant reduction in the risk to UK forces but that the

provision of CITADELs would not be of great benefit at this stage of the campaign.”

1116.  Gen Walker directed AM Torpy to prepare a Ministerial note on the force

protection of UK camps with “a clear explanation of both compartmentalisation and the

CITADEL concept” and with the statistical analysis from the trials.

1117.  On 30 March, a PJHQ official sent a slightly revised copy of AM Torpy’s paper

to Mr Hoon, asking him to note the Chiefs of Staff’s decision.589

1118.  The official advised Mr Hoon that the improved level of protection afforded by

CITADEL had been weighed against:

• “the relatively low frequency of and threat from indirect fire attacks”;

• the hazards inherent in implementing CITADEL, such as the large number of

predictable road movements to transport materials to each UK camp;

• the “perceived diminution in the quality of life that would result from insisting that

our troops adopt a CITADEL solution”;

• the investment in existing accommodation; and

• the “fact that protection is only provided […] one third of the day”.

1119.  On presentation, the official advised Mr Hoon that there was “a risk that, in the

event of a sudden and unexpected upturn in violence”, the MOD “could be accused of

not having done ‘everything possible’ to ensure the safety of our personnel”. The official

wrote that “no measures” could offer “an absolute guarantee of safety” and that force

protection consisted of TTPs as well as physical measures:

“In this case, as with most aspects of operations, we have to make a judgement on

what is sensible and practicable.”

1120.  Mr Hoon endorsed the minute the following day.590 He asked for press lines to be

prepared to defend the MOD’s position “against the accusation that this decision was

taken on cost grounds rather than balanced and pragmatic advice”.

1121.  The issue of hardening accommodation arose again in September 2006 after

a gradual increase in the number of IDF attacks.

1122.  General Sir Richard Dannatt, CGS, visited Iraq from 26 to 28 September 2006.591

In his visit report to Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, CDS, he wrote that difficulties

589  Minute PJHQ [junior official] to PS/SofS [MOD], 30 March 2005, ‘Iraq: Force Protection at UK Camps’.

590  Minute APS/SofS [MOD] to PJHQ [junior official], 31 March 2005, ‘Iraq: Force protection at UK Camps’.

591  Minute Dannatt to Stirrup, 2 October 2006, ‘CGS’ Visit to Iraq: 26‑28 Sep 06’.

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