9.8 |
Conclusions: The post-conflict period
109.
After becoming
Defence Secretary in May 2005, Dr Reid had continued the
policy
of reducing
UK troop levels based on the transition of lead responsibility for
security
to the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In one of his early acts as Defence
Secretary, he
announced
the deployment of just over 400 additional personnel to enhance the
UK’s
effort in
training the ISF, which would “enable them to take on ever greater
responsibility
for their
own security and so pave the way for UK troops to
withdraw”.31
110.
The proposals
for transfer of the four provinces in MND(SE) to Iraqi control
agreed
in July
2005 suggested transition from MNF-I to ISF primacy in Basra from
March 2006,
based on
the assumption that the ISF would, by that point, be capable of
taking on
responsibility
for security in what was likely to remain a very challenging
environment.
111.
There was
sufficient reliable contemporary evidence available, including from
the
JIC and in
reports from commanders in theatre, to demonstrate that the
assumption that
the ISF
would be ready to take the lead in Basra by that point was probably
unrealistic.
112.
In September
2005, Mr Blair expressed his concerns about ISF capability,
following
reports of
police involvement in attacks on the MNF in Basra. But despite the
concerns
that had
been expressed about the capacity of the ISF, Dr Reid recommended
that a
reduction
in UK forces should take place in October or November
2005.
113.
A few days
after Dr Reid made his recommendation, the Jameat incident in
Basra
raised
questions about the ISF in MND(SE). Officials from the FCO, the MOD
and
DFID judged
that the incident had highlighted the risks to achieving UK
objectives in
MND(SE),
and that those risks had implications for military resources.
Nevertheless,
assumptions
about ISF readiness were not re-examined by Ministers. The
incident
should have
prompted a more searching analysis of whether the conditions
necessary
for
drawdown were likely to be met within the planned timetable.
Reluctance to consider
the
potential implications of the Jameat incident obscured what it had
revealed about the
security
situation in MND(SE).
114.
The critical
importance of ISF capability in assessing readiness for transfer
to
Provincial
Iraqi Control, on which UK plans to draw down were based, was
emphasised
by the
‘Conditions for Provincial Transfer’ published by the Joint
Iraqi/MNF Committee
to Transfer
Security Responsibility, and by Dr Reid, who told DOP(I) that
“successful
Iraqiisation
remains the key”.32
DOP(I)
decided that Dr Reid should have lead
responsibility
for building the capacity of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) in
Basra in
addition to
his responsibility for the Iraqi Army.
115.
In October
2005, Mr Blair asked for a major and sustained push to make
progress
on the
ability of the ISF to take the lead on security. Gen Jackson raised
concerns about
31
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 25 May
2005, column 15WS.
32
Paper Reid,
11 October 2005, ‘Iraq: Security Update’.
489