The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

40. Mr Blair left President Bush in no doubt that he needed a second resolution

to secure Parliamentary support for UK involvement in military action and sought

support for his initiative of setting out tests in a side statement, including that the

vote in the Security Council might have to be delayed “by a couple of days”.

41. Offered the opportunity not to take military action, Mr Blair assured President

Bush the UK would be with the US “if he possibly could be”.

42. President Bush was evidently unwilling to countenance delay and was

reported to have told Mr Blair that, if the second resolution failed, he would find

another way to involve the UK.

43. Mr Blair and President Bush discussed the position late on 9 March, including the

positions of Mexico and Chile.15

44. Mr Blair told President Bush that he was working with President Lagos on identifying

tests for compliance in five specific areas and suggested that they (the US and the UK)

should consider delaying the vote by a couple of days.

45. Mr Blair told President Bush that “he [Mr Blair] would be with the US if he possibly

could be”.

46. Mr Rycroft recorded that President Bush responded that if the second resolution

failed, he would find another way to involve the UK. He would “rather go alone militarily

than have the British Government fall”.

47. President Bush wrote in his memoir that he told Mr Blair he would “rather have

him drop out of the Coalition and keep his government than try to stay in and lose it”;

and that Mr Blair said, “I’m with you … I absolutely believe in this. I will take it up to the

very last”.16

48. Mr Campbell wrote:

“TB started by saying he was ‘fighting on all fronts’. ‘Attaboy’ came the reply, a bit

too patronisingly for my tastes. TB said one of his Ministers was threatening to

resign, also that Chirac [Mr Jacques Chirac, the French President] told Lagos that

the Africans were ‘in the bag’ … TB had spoken to four of the leaders who made

up the 8 plus 1. Musharraf [Mr Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani President] was

with us but it was difficult for him. Cameroon said absolutely. Guinea’s Foreign

Minister coming tomorrow. Dos Santos [Mr José Eduardo Dos Santos, the Angolan

President] solid.

“TB was doing most of the talking … He felt Bush needed to work some more on

Fox. He felt if we could get them to accept the idea of the tests, other countries

15 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 9 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Bush, 9 March’.

16 Bush GW. Decision Points. Virgin Books, 2010.

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