The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
a threat,
he would never co‑operate fully with the international community,
and the
world, not
to say Iraq would be better off with him out of power. My instinct
was with
them. Our
alliance was with them. I had made a commitment after September 11
to
be
‘shoulder‑to‑shoulder’. I was determined to fulfil it.
“On the
other hand, my isolation within Cabinet, let alone the PLP and
large parts
of the
media and public opinion, was colossal. And worrying, not because I
might
go down
… but because so much was at stake. War and peace. The
struggle
against
terrorism. The future of our treasured alliance. The reputation of
the country
and its
armed forces. Above all, people’s lives. Either way people’s lives,
since
‘peace’
would not be peace for those in Iraq under the boot of
Saddam.”305
931.
In his
statement for the Inquiry, Mr Blair wrote:
“The
political debate then crystallised in late 2002/early 2003 around
calls for
a second
resolution.
“We
discussed this at various Cabinet meetings, the first of which was
from my
recollection,
that of 16 January 2003. It was then debated again at 30
January,
6 February,
13 February, 27 February and 6 March Cabinet meetings. In
addition,
of course,
it was informally hotly debated everywhere. In this instance there
was
no disagreement:
everyone thought it was politically beneficial.”
932.
Mr Blair
also wrote:
“There was
no doubt this was the easiest thing politically, both domestically
for the
Government
and internationally, to build the broader coalition. So in January
2003
we began
discreetly to canvass support. When asked, we said we were open
to
one but did
not need one. I also knew that Robin Cook was likely to resign in
the
absence of
one.
“We
certainly believed at the outset that if we could push the US to go
for it, we had
a real
chance of getting it, though it would be very difficult. Germany’s
leader had
apparently
told President Bush that it would not support but it would not
oppose.
There were
reasonable discussions with France, though by early February,
France
had
hardened again. The US were working hard on the
Russians.”306
“We knew we
would not ever get a resolution explicitly authorising force. But
we
thought it
possible that the resolution might state what we all knew to be the
case:
that Saddam
was not fully and unconditionally co‑operating. The Blix reports
were
clear that
any co‑operation fell short. In particular, Blix lacked the ability
to conduct
interviews
without restrictions, a key issue for the inspections. So a ‘final’
final
ultimatum
resolution might be agreed.”
305
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
306
Statement,
14 January 2001, pages 7‑8.
170