The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Iraq’s
obligations in the relevant Security Council resolutions, and the
potential
difficulties
in relying in 2002 on existing resolutions to support the further
use of force.96
287.
As well as
examining the legal base for the No-Fly Zones, the Security
Council
resolutions
relevant to the sanctions regime and resolution 1284 which had
established
UNMOVIC,
the FCO addressed three possible bases under international law
whereby
the use of
force could be authorised in relation to the circumstances of Iraq.
It stated that
two of the
bases – self-defence and humanitarian intervention – were not
applicable at
that
time.
288.
The third
potential legal base was the possibility that the authorisation to
use force
in
resolution 678 (1990) could be revived. That had happened in the
past, most recently
when Iraq
refused to co-operate with the UNSCOM in 1997 and 1998. A series
of
Security
Council resolutions had condemned Iraq.
289.
Resolution
1205 (1998) had condemned Iraq’s decision to end all
co-operation
with UNSCOM
as a “flagrant violation” of Iraq’s obligations under resolution
687 (1991),
and
restated that effective operation of UNSCOM was essential for the
implementation
of that
resolution. In the UK’s view, that had had the effect of reviving
the authorisation
to use
force in resolution 678.
290.
In a letter to
the President of the Security Council in 1998, the UK had
“stated
that the
objective of Operation Desert Fox was to seek compliance by Iraq
with the
obligations
laid down by the Council, that the operation was undertaken only
when it
became
apparent that there was no other way of achieving compliance by
Iraq, and
that the
action was limited to what was necessary to secure this
objective”.97
291.
The revival
argument and the UK’s position during the 1990s are set out
in
Section 5.
292.
The FCO drew
attention to potential difficulties in relying on existing
Security
Council
resolutions to support further use of force in 2002:
“The more
difficult issue is whether we are still able to rely on the same
legal base
for the use
of force more than three years after the adoption of resolution
1205.
Military
action in 1998 (and on previous occasions) followed on from
specific
decisions
of the Council; there has now not been any significant decision by
the
Council
since 1998. Our interpretation of resolution 1205 was controversial
anyway;
many of our
partners did not think the legal basis was sufficient as the
authority
96
Paper FCO,
[undated], ‘Iraq: Legal Background’, attached to Cabinet Office
Paper, 8 March 2002, ‘Iraq:
Options
Paper’.
97
UN Security
Council, ‘Letter dated 16 December 1998 from the Permanent
Representative of the United
Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed
to the President of the
Security
Council’ (S/1998/1182).
438