The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
21.
Mr Straw
shared Mr Powell’s view that it was unlikely that Iraq would
refuse
to accept
resolution 1441. He suggested two particular issues warranted
further
consideration:
•
First, both
France and Russia had insisted that, in the event of an
Iraqi
breach, the
matter should be referred back to the Security Council
for
further
consideration before a decision on military action. The “UK’s
current
understanding
was that it was unlikely that, if it came to a vote, there would
be
any veto by
France … If there were to be any veto … this was likely to be
only
by
Russia.”
•
Secondly,
Mr Straw would be “interested” in Lord Goldsmith’s views on
“the
effect of a
resolution being adopted by the House of Commons …
following
the
contemplated debate on Iraq”. Mr Straw identified two options:
a resolution
endorsing
1441 and one including “an acknowledgement that there
would
inevitably
be military action if peaceful resolution of the issue were not
possible”.
His
preference was for the former.
22.
Lord
Goldsmith’s initial view was that, leaving aside the political
advantages,
a resolution
of the House of Commons:
“… would
not have any bearing on the position in international law as
regards the
lawfulness
of using force against Iraq. It might be that a case could be
constructed
seeking to
justify such action, if a number of other Parliaments in …
countries who
are members
of the Security Council were also to adopt such a resolution. But
he
thought
that … would be a rather subtle and speculative
argument.”
23.
Mr Straw
thought that military action was some way further down the track
but,
“if Iraq
were to be found in breach” of resolution 1441, it would be
“essential … we act
pretty
swiftly to take military action”. One of the reasons “was that
there might well be
a need
for less military force if action was swift”.
24.
Lord Goldsmith
“commented that, from the point of view of legality, the key
question
would be
whether Iraq’s non-compliance with resolution 1441 amounted to a
material
breach and
who was to make this determination”.
25.
Mr Straw
“pointed out that it was clear to him that the US – despite its
bellicose
rhetoric –
would not wish to go to war for nothing”.
26.
Mr Straw
“mentioned that, reading resolution 1441 again as a layman, it was
pretty
clear that
the Security Council were basically telling Iraq – ‘Comply or
else’.” In
response
to Lord
Goldsmith’s observation that “the question was who was to decide
the ‘or else’”,
Mr Straw
pointed out that resolution 1441 could have:
“… said in
terms that it was for the Security Council to decide whether there
was a
material
breach and what action would then ensue. However … [it] did not …
France
and Russia
had accepted the US/UK argument that this should be left open
and
8