The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• Reaching Baghdad “as swiftly as possible, thus bringing the end of the regime

closer” was “the vital goal”. There were “bound … to be difficult days ahead, but

the strategy and its timing are proceeding according to plan”.

180.  On 24 March, Sir David Manning spoke to Dr Rice.121 She indicated that the

appearance of “irregular forces” alongside Iraqi regular forces in Umm Qasr and

elsewhere “was proving a tough combination to deal with”.

181.  In a reference to the legacy of the previous Gulf Conflict, Sir David also recorded:

“One of the problems was that many people in Iraq were still unsure whether we

were determined to complete the job this time. Only when they were certain that we

would get rid of Saddam … would they conclude it was safe to turn on the regime’s

henchmen. Ironically the care that we had taken over targeting … and the decision

to leave the broadcasting and communications systems up and running, had

probably fed popular doubts about our determination.”

182.  Sir David reported Dr Rice as stating that it was not clear if the Iraqi people knew

the Coalition was winning.

183.  In a discussion with President Bush on 24 March, Mr Blair identified the

Fedayeen, the Medina Division of the Republican Guard and the use of Iraqi media

and communications facilities for military purposes as the “trickiest issues ahead”.122

There was a need to “dampen expectations” and “exercise extreme care” in

targeting decisions.

184.  Mr Blair also underlined the importance of Coalition Forces finding Saddam

Hussein’s WMD.

185.  The MOD reported on the evening of 24 March that:

“Major General Brims [is] still considering his options on entering Basra. He intends

to move some elements of 3 Commando Brigade (some of Black Watch) into

az‑Zubayr (town 10 miles south west of Basra) as a test of how city/town fighting

might go. This example should help inform decisions on Basra.” 123

186.  The MOD also reported that the US V Corps had “paused as planned near Najaf”.

187.  The COBR report on key events for 24 March stated that the operation as a whole

was:

“Just ahead of expected timelines at moment but weather deteriorating.” 124

121  Letter Manning to McDonald, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.

122  Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s telephone conversation with

President Bush, 24 February [sic]’.

123  Briefing [MOD], 24 March 2003, ‘Annex to Evening Sitrep 24 March: Military’.

124  Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Manning, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: COBR Round Up of

Key Events – 24 March’.

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