The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
454.
Mr Powell
confirmed that No.10 did not wish the Attorney General’s
advice
to “become
public”.
455.
Lord
Goldsmith did not inform Mr Straw or Mr Hoon of his
change of view.
456.
As their
responsibilities were directly engaged, they should have been
told
of Lord
Goldsmith’s change of position.
457.
At the request
of No.10, Lord Goldsmith met Mr Powell, Baroness Morgan
and
Sir David
Manning on 27 February.181
458.
Ms Adams
advised Lord Goldsmith that the purpose of the meeting was to
“discuss
the French
veto”, which she interpreted as meaning “the scope for action in
the absence
of a second
resolution”.
459.
Ms Adams
provided a speaking note for Lord Goldsmith, setting out the
legal
arguments
in detail, including:
•
the
discussions with Mr Straw, Sir Jeremy Greenstock and the US
Administration
“were
valuable” and had given Lord Goldsmith “background information on
the
negotiating
history” which he had “not previously had”;
•
the US
discussions were “particularly useful” as they gave “a clearer
insight
into the
important US/French bilateral discussions over the terms of OP12
of
resolution
1441”;
•
that was
“relevant to the interpretation of the resolution”;
•
while the
revival argument was “controversial”, Lord Goldsmith had
“already
made clear”
that he agreed with the advice of his predecessors that it
provided
“a valid
legal basis for the use of force provided that the conditions for
revival”
were
“satisfied”;
•
the
“arguments in support of the revival argument” were “stronger
following
adoption of
resolution 1441”;
•
“elements”
of resolution 1441 indicated that the Security Council “intended
to
revive the
authorisation in [resolution] 678”;
•
but the
Council “clearly … did not intend 678 to revive
immediately”;
•
the
procedure set out in OPs 4,11 and 12 “for determining whether or
not Iraq
has taken
the final opportunity” were “somewhat ambiguous”;
•
it was
“clear” that if Iraq did not comply there would be “a further
Council
discussion”
but it was “not clear what happens next”;
•
it was
“arguable” that OPs 4 and 12 indicated that “a further Council
decision”
was
“required”;
•
Lord
Goldsmith had been “impressed” by the “strength and sincerity” of
the US
view that
they had “conceded a Council discussion and no more”;
181
Minute
Adams to Attorney General, 26 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting at
No.10, 27 February’.
82