The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
and role.
In his view, it would be sensible for Ministers to confirm now that
transition
in 2008
was not an option:
“To do so
would simplify military planning, allow us to concentrate on
meeting our
objectives
in Basra, ease our relations with the US and remove the risk of
being
accused of
misleading domestic audiences without prejudging when and how
we
make the
transition in 2009.”
38.
Mr Browne
recommended that the Committee on National Security,
International
Relations
and Defence (NSID) should commission the Iraq Strategy Group to
produce
a refined
set of options for consideration the following month, together with
a draft
Parliamentary
statement announcing the strategy to November and giving an
indication
of future
possibilities.
39.
In an
Assessment dated 14 May, at the request of the FCO the JIC
examined
the impact
of ISF operations against the JAM in Basra on Prime Minister
Maliki, his
government
and the Sadrists.10
The JIC’s
Key Judgements included:
“I. Prime
Minister Maliki is enjoying broad political support following the
success
of Iraqi
security forces’ (ISF) operations against the Jaysh al-Mahdi in
Basra (the
Charge of
the Knights). Enthusiasm for dialogue on vital legislative issues
has
increased.
“II. Maliki
… still has many critics …
“III. The
Charge has significantly weakened JAM in Basra. Its disparate
factions
are unlikely
to recover their dominance of Basra’s streets any time soon
…
“IV. …
Expectations in Basra are high. Maliki will need to deliver
improvements in
public
services and job creation in weeks … The same will apply in other
places
where the
ISF take on JAM.”
40.
In relation to
the operation itself, the JIC judged that:
“Strong JAM
resistance in the initial phases of the Charge exposed
enduring
weaknesses
in the largely untested local ISF, though co-ordination improved as
the
operation
progressed and more experienced Iraqi units from elsewhere
performed
significantly
better. Targeted and sophisticated Multi-National Forces air
support
and assistance
in command and control was also key to the eventual success
of
the Charge
…”
41.
On 16 May, Maj
Gen White-Spunner reported that the Deputy Commanding
General of
MNC-I, who had deployed to Basra during the Charge of the Knights,
had left
MND(SE),
leaving behind a “strong detachment” of US forces.11
Maj Gen
White-Spunner
10
JIC
Assessment, 14 May 2008, ‘Iraq: the Charge of the
Knights’.
11
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 16 May 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 15
May 2008’.
388