8 | The
invasion
46.
The roles
which UK forces would play during combat operations were set out
in
a letter
from Mr Peter Watkins, Mr Hoon’s Principal Private
Secretary, to Sir David
Manning,
Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser, on 11
March.34
47.
The UK role
within the US plan was described as “crucial in all three
operating
environments”.
The role of UK Special Forces is described in a Box later in this
Section.
48.
Mr Watkins
wrote that the plan required 3 Commando Brigade to seize the
oil
infrastructure
on the al-Faw Peninsula in the early hours of the operation, by
means of
a
combination of amphibious and helicopter assault. The US 15th
Marine Expeditionary
Unit (15
MEU) was placed under the command of HQ 3 Commando Brigade for
the
operation
to capture the port of Umm Qasr.
49.
The Royal Navy
was to deliver the amphibious forces and to ensure the safe
transit
of
personnel and equipment by sea. Mine Counter Measure (MCM) vessels
were to
clear the
approaches to Umm Qasr.
50.
UK submarines
were tasked with delivering Tomahawk Land Attack
Missiles
(TLAMs) for
initial air strikes.
51.
Royal Navy
ships, embarked helicopters and RAF maritime patrol aircraft
were
to maintain
a “maritime blockade” of the Iraqi coast and provide force
protection
against Iraqi
and terrorist threats. MCM vessels were to clear mines from Iraqi
ports
and waterways.
52.
The RAF was to
deliver offensive air strikes and provide close air support
to
Coalition,
not just UK, forces.
53.
The plan also
called for the RAF to provide air defence, air-to-air refuelling
and
ISTAR
(Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance)
capabilities,
maritime
patrol aircraft and transport and logistics support.
54.
The MOD’s
account and analysis of the operation published in July 2003
described
the main
tasks of the air campaign as:
•
to
neutralise the Iraqi air force and Integrated Air Defence
system;
•
to conduct
strategic attacks against regime targets;
•
to provide
air support to Coalition land forces;
•
to deter
and counter the threat from theatre ballistic missiles,
especially
in the west
of Iraq; and
•
to destroy
the Republican Guard divisions.35
55.
Mr Watkins
wrote that, following the initial operations, 1 (UK) Div, operating
under
the command
of the US 1 MEF, was to follow US forces into Iraq to secure the
South,
34
Minute
Watkins to Manning, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: The Military
Plan’.
35
Ministry of
Defence, Operations
in Iraq: First Reflections, July
2003.
13