12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
84.
On the Iraqi
police, the assessment stated:
“We have
very little reporting on the organisation of Iraq’s Civil Police.
And we have
no
information specific to Basra … We have little idea as to how the
police will act
during a
Coalition attack or in the aftermath. Limited anecdotal reporting
suggest
[sic] that
they are likely to disappear from the street.”
85.
The
establishment of law and order was described as an “important”
factor in the
reaction of
the Basra populace to Coalition control. However, the DIS judged
that “in the
absence of
a civil police force and other security forces this will prove
difficult”.
86.
The paper also
addressed the dismissal of Ba’ath Party members from the
military
and civil
administration. The DIS assessed that:
“Directorate
of General Security (DGS), DGI (Directorate of General
Intelligence),
SSO
(Special Security Organisations) elements and Ba’ath Party militia
should be
disbanded.
Ba’ath leadership (Udw
Firqa/Fara)
might also need to be detained …
“… But
within Basra City there seems to [sic] no organisation with a
better
understanding
of tribal relationships, the civil populace, internal security
matters and
provision
of public services than the Ba’ath Party. Many party members will
not have
been
involved in repressive activity. We assess that Ba’ath Party
members will have
to be
utilised by any military administration, at least in the early
phases of control.”
87.
On 18 March,
the day before the invasion began, the MOD Defence
Advisory
Team (DAT)
produced a paper on SSR and the future Iraqi armed
forces.67
The
paper
was
designed “to inform UK policy making and assist in advancing US
thinking on
these
topics”. Much of its content revisited the themes discussed in the
FCO paper of
10 December
2002, which had already been shared with the US.
88.
The MOD paper
listed the range of SSR activities in which the UK could
be
expected to
participate as follows:
•
DDR;
•
clearance
of unexploded ordnance (de‑mining);
•
reconstruction
of the Iraqi armed forces;
•
non‑military
security forces and intelligence services;
•
police and
law enforcement;
•
border
control; and
•
judicial
systems.
67
Minute IPU
[junior official] to IPU Members, 18 March 2003, ‘Security Sector
Reform: Future Iraqi Armed
Forces’
attaching Paper Defence Advisory Team, March 2003, ‘Security Sector
Reform: Future Iraqi Armed
Forces’.
83